





The Increase in Income Cyclicality of 
High-Income Households and Its 
Relation to the Rise in Top Income Shares
ABSTRACT We document a large increase in the cyclicality of the incomes
of high-income households, coinciding with the rise in their share of aggre-
gate income. In the United States, since top income shares began to rise rapidly
in the early 1980s, incomes of those in the top 1 percent of the income distribu-
tion have averaged 14 times average income and been 2.4 times more cyclical.
Before the early 1980s, incomes of the top 1 percent were slightly less cycli-
cal than average. The increase in cyclicality at the top is to a large extent due to
increases in the share and the cyclicality of their earned income. The high cycli-
cality among top incomes is found for households without stock options; fol-
lowing the same households over time; for post-tax, post-transfer income; and
for consumption. We study cyclicality throughout the income distribution and
reconcile our ﬁndings with earlier work. Furthermore, greater top income share
is associated with greater top income cyclicality across recent decades, across
subgroups of top income households, and, in changes, across countries. This
suggests a common cause. We show theoretically that increases in the produc-
tion scale of the most talented can raise both top incomes and their cyclicality.
S
ince the early 1970s, economic inequality in the United States—as
measured by the distribution of wages and salaries, or of income more
broadly, or of consumption expenditure—has been steadily increasing.
1 The
consensus explanation for the general increase in inequality is that skill-
1. For wages and salaries this change was ﬁrst documented by Bound and Johnson (1992)
and Katz and Murphy (1992). The increase that began in the 1970s and 1980s continued
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skills, as measured, for example, by education. However, accompanying
this steady rise in inequality has been a much larger and more rapid increase
in the income share of those at the very top of the income distribution. The
share of (non-capital gains) income accruing to those in the top 1 percent of
the income distribution increased from 8 percent in the early 1980s to 18 per-
cent in 2008; the income share for those in the top 0.01 percent increased
from around 0.7 percent to 3.3 percent over the same period (Piketty and
Saez 2003, Saez 2010). Both the suddenness and the magnitude of these
increases have shifted perceptions about the importance of technological
change as the cause of increased income inequality generally and raised the
possibility of an important role for other factors, such as “changes in labor
market institutions, ﬁscal policy, or more generally social norms regarding
pay inequality” (Piketty and Saez 2003, p. 3).
In this paper we bring together evidence from a variety of datasets to
show that, as ﬁrst argued in Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen (2009), another
fundamental shift has occurred across the U.S. income distribution. Dur-
ing the past quarter century the incomes of high-income households have
become much more sensitive to aggregate income fluctuations than pre-
viously. Before the early 1980s, the incomes of high-income households
were more often than not less cyclical than the income of the average
household. But since around 1982 the incomes of the top 1 percent have
become more than twice as sensitive to aggregate income fluctuations as
the income of the average household.
The fact that this increase in the cyclicality of income of the top 1 per-
cent coincides with the increase in their income share suggests that a com-
mon cause underlies both phenomena. We provide further evidence for a
link between increased income inequality and increased income cyclicality
at the top by documenting, ﬁrst, that across income groups within the top
1 percent, higher average income is associated with higher income cycli-
cality in the 1982–2008 period; second, that across decades since the 1970s,
cyclicality of the top 1 percent increases decade by decade as that group’s
income share increases; and third, across countries, increases in income
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through the 1990s and into the 2000s in the top half of the wage distribution (Autor, Katz,
and Kearney 2008). On increasing inequality in consumption, see Cutler and Katz (1991),
Attanasio and Davis (1996), and Heathcote, Perri, and Violante (2010). Although the survey
information on households suggests that the increase in the overall distribution of inequality
in expenditure has been signiﬁcantly less than that observed for income, this may partially be
an issue of measurement of expenditure (see, for example, Aguiar and Bils 2010).
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income share.
We argue that these facts are not inconsistent with the hypothesis that the
increase in top income shares was caused by rapid technological progress in
information and communications technologies (ICT) since the early 1980s.
If improvements in ICT have increased the ability of the most talented
workers to handle more work or to scale their ideas by working with more
production inputs, then the ICT revolution could have caused the incomes
of the highest paid both to rise and to become more sensitive to economic
fluctuations. The intuition is that individuals who have less decreasing
returns to scale will operate at a greater scale (that is, with more produc-
tion inputs) and have lower ratios of gross revenue to production costs,
and therefore have greater sensitivity of earnings to business cycles.
Expanding on these contributions, we begin in section I by focusing on
the details of the change in income cyclicality of top income groups in the
United States. We use the Statistics of Income (SOI) data of Thomas Piketty
and Emmanuel Saez (Piketty and Saez 2003, Saez 2010), which are based
on tax records, to show that the average income (before taxes and trans-
fers and excluding capital gains) accruing to those in the very top of the
income distribu-tion has moved substantially more (in percentage terms)
than the overall average in each boom and each recession since 1982, on
average rising 5.0 percentage points more per year in each boom and
falling 3.7 percentage points more per year in each recession. Before 1982,
however, this was not the case.
This high cyclicality is not simply due to capital or entrepreneurial
income. High-income tax units (one or more individuals filing a single
return) tend to have a signiﬁcant share of income from wages and salaries
(including bonuses), and this type of income has roughly the same exposure
to fluctuations as their nonwage income. Wage and salary income is also
a major source of the change in cyclicality of top incomes. Before 1982
the wage and salary income of high-income tax units was roughly acycli-
cal, but since 1982 it has been highly cyclical. Also, we show that the top
1 percent of earners come from a broad range of industries and occupa-
tions, and we argue that no one industry’s or occupation’s pay structure is
driving our ﬁnding.
Further, we provide three pieces of evidence that although high-income
households are more likely to have stock options, our main finding is not
driven by the potentially endogenous timing of the exercise of stock
options. First, in the period since 1997 for which we have data, only about
22 percent of households in the top 1 percent have stock options (that is,
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when surveyed), and income cyclicality of households in the top 1 percent
is roughly similar if one leaves out households with stock options. Sec-
ond, for a sample of top corporate executives for whom we have informa-
tion about the value of options granted, we ﬁnd that income calculated by
including options only when granted, rather than when exercised, is highly
cyclical. To be clear, this evidence in no way rules out a causal explana-
tion that involves a general rise in pay for performance—indeed, options
income is highly cyclical for those who have options, and bonus income
may serve a similar purpose for those in the top 1 percent without options
income. Our point is simply that the high cyclicality of the wage and salary
(and overall) income of the top 1 percent is not spuriously generated by
a correlation between the timing of options exercise and aggregate fluc-
tuations. Third, as a further piece of evidence that the high cyclicality is
neither due to endogenous timing of income without economic signiﬁ-
cance nor due to other measurement problems in income data, we show
that the cyclicality of the consumption of households in the top of the con-
sumption expenditure distribution—speciﬁcally, the top 5 percent by ini-
tial consumption—is also more than twice that of the average household.
Additional evidence conﬁrming the high cyclicality of top incomes comes
from verifying the out-of-sample forecasts made in Parker and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2009) based on cyclicality estimates that excluded the recent
recession. Income data for 2008 and consumption expenditure data through
February 2009 show sharp declines for the top 1 percent during the recent
recession, consistent with these predictions.
How does this new fact relate to the prior literature that concludes that
low-income households bear the brunt of recessions and beneﬁt the most
from expansions? In section II, using data from the Current Population
Survey (CPS), we show that the incomes of low-education households are
more cyclical than those of high-education households and that the greater
cyclicality of the top 1 percent does not appear in the CPS before 1982. Fur-
ther, looking at the whole distribution using a dataset from the Congres-
sional Budget Ofﬁce that merges the CPS with the SOI tax data on high
incomes, we ﬁnd that the sensitivity of the wage and salary income of house-
holds in the bottom two quintiles to ﬂuctuations in aggregate income is
slightly higher than that of households in the third and fourth quintiles and
than that of households from the 80th to the 99th percentiles.
However, in the public CPS data for the period since 1982, when one ranks
by percentile in the income distribution, the top 1 percent have a higher cycli-
cality than even the lowest education group (those with less than a high
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measured using the CPS top 1 percent income series constructed by Richard
Burkhauser and coauthors (2008, 2009) from underlying CPS data not sub-
ject to the top coding applied to the public ﬁles. Thus, top incomes are highly
cyclical, but it is harder to observe this high cyclicality in the publicly avail-
able CPS data alone because of top coding, and because cyclicality is high
only for very high income households. We conclude that across the distribu-
tion of incomes, cyclicality is asymmetrically U-shaped: it is higher for the
bottom quintiles than for the middle and the upper-middle class, but much
higher for the top 1 percent, and especially for the very highest incomes.
Different cyclicalities of taxes and transfers at different points in the
income distribution can lead to differences in cyclicality between pre-tax,
pre-transfer cash income and disposable (post-tax, post-transfer) income.
We show that taxes and especially transfers signiﬁcantly reduce the cycli-
cality at the bottom of the income distribution while making less differ-
ence to the cyclicality of the very top. Thus, the cyclicality of top 1 percent
incomes relative to the rest of the population is even greater for disposable
income than it is for pre-tax, pre-transfer income.
Having established and explored our main ﬁnding for the United States,
in section III we present evidence from Canada, which has a different tax
system, slightly different culture, and better available information on top
incomes from tax records. In the Canadian tax data, top income cyclicality
is quite similar to that in the United States during the past quarter century.
Further, in the Canadian data we are able to follow families across years
(that is, we use panel data). Families in the top 1 percent of the income dis-
tribution in one year have income changes to the next year that are almost
twice as cyclical as for the average. This higher cyclicality for the top 1 per-
cent is similar in repeated cross-sectional data and in panel data, suggesting
that the availability of only repeated cross-sectional data in the U.S. tax data
is unlikely to substantially affect the estimated U.S. cyclicalities.
Section IV presents evidence of a strong link between increased income
inequality and increased income cyclicality at the top by exploiting varia-
tion across groups, decades, and countries. We split the top 1 percent into
three groups (percentiles 99–99.9, 99.9–99.99, and 99.99–100) and docu-
ment for the period since 1982 that across these groups, the higher the
average income, the higher the income cyclicality. Furthermore, calculat-
ing cyclicalities by decade since 1970, we show that for a given top group,
as its income share increases, the cyclicality of its income increases.
Finally, comparing the period 1970–82 with the period 1982–2007 using
data for 10 countries, we ﬁnd that those with larger increases in the income
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ity of the top 1 percent.
The link between increased inequality and increased cyclicality suggests
a common cause of the two phenomena. In section V we argue that the
increase in cyclicality is not inconsistent with an explanation of the increase
in top income shares based on market-driven changes in incomes rather
than, for example, changes in social norms. Speciﬁcally, we outline an
explanation for both phenomena based on the rapid improvements in ICT
in recent decades. Skill-biased technological progress that takes the form
of lowering the degree of decreasing returns to scale for the highest-skill
individuals naturally leads to increases in both the incomes and the income
cyclicality of these individuals.
We emphasize that our results do not imply that the utility or happiness
of high-income households is more cyclical that that of the average house-
hold. In fact, if risk aversion is lower at high expenditure levels, the utility
of high-income households may be less cyclical than that of lower-income
households, even with higher income cyclicality. Instead, our main ﬁnding
establishes a new fact that is informative about changes in incomes and the
labor market for high earners and of particular relevance for theories of the
recent rise in income shares of high-income households.
I. The Changing Cyclicality of High Incomes
In this section we document the changing cyclicality of the income that
accrues to top percentile groups in the income distribution, using the Sta-
tistics of Income data compiled by Piketty and Saez (2003) and extended
by Saez (2010). In doing so, we study the timing of the change in cyclicality
documented by Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen (2009). We show that the dra-
matic increase in the cyclicality of high incomes started in the early 1980s,
and that this increase is signiﬁcantly due to earned income and not just due to
the (potentially endogenous) timing of executive stock option compensation.
I.A. The Main Facts
The main advantage of the Piketty-Saez data is that since they are based
on administrative data from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) on individ-
ual income tax returns, they provide extensive and accurate measurement
of the very top of the income distribution. However, since some low-
income households do not file tax returns (and even fewer did in the ear-
lier years covered by the data), there is little detail on the low end of the
income distribution. Piketty and Saez use aggregate personal income data
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1944; after 1944 they use the available tax return data plus an assumption
about the incomes of nonﬁlers. Using these data, Piketty and Saez track the
trend in the income share of the top 1 percent, 0.1 percent, and 0.01 percent
of the income distribution, information simply not available in survey-
based datasets on wages and incomes. The detail available on tax returns
allows the measurement of pre-tax, pre-transfer cash income excluding
realized capital gains. We exclude capital gains because our focus is on the
timing of income, and the data contain only measures of realized capital
gains, not capital gains as they accrue.
The data have some shortcomings, however. First, income excludes
income paid as benefits (such as employer-paid health benefits and con-
tributions to pensions) and excludes the employer share of payroll taxes
(Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment taxes). Second, the unit of
observation in these data is a tax unit, not an individual or a household.
There has been a steady downward trend in the number of individuals per
tax unit over time. This is a concern for measurement of trends if this ratio
changes unevenly across income groups, but it poses less of a concern for
our measurement of business cycle exposure. Third, the data are repeated
cross sections and contain little information on demographics or other
information that could allow one to track income changes for a constant
population of households. Thus, the changes in income we report are based
on income and income rank for groups of households that overlap but are
not completely identical across years.
2
Finally, incomes as reported to the IRS may be affected by tax reforms
and by a variety of tax avoidance and tax evasion activities such as non-
reporting of income, sheltering of income in 401(k)s, and changes in the
reporting of income between closely held business profits and personal
income. Tax reforms pose a particular concern since they cause changes in
total reported taxable income that are potentially different across different
ﬁlers. To the extent that such changes disproportionately affect high-income
ﬁlers, this creates an artiﬁcially high correlation between changes in aggre-
gate reported taxable income and changes in the reported taxable income
of top income filers. To avoid this problem, we do not measure cyclical-
ity from correlations with tax return–based aggregates, but instead use
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2. We address each of these issues in our analysis of the Canadian data below and argue
that focusing on a constant set of households does not lead to materially different results for
the income cyclicality of the top 1 percent.
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the online data appendix for details).
3 Given this solution, tax reforms as
well as the other data issues likely pose larger problems for measuring
long-term trends than for measuring cyclicalities (see Reynolds 2007 and
Piketty and Saez 2007).
We begin our analysis of these data by reporting the percent growth
in income across each boom and recession since 1917, where “boom”
and “recession” are defined, respectively, as periods during which NIPA
real income per tax unit, before taxes and transfers and excluding capital
gains, was increasing, and periods during which it was decreasing. Gen-
erally, these periods line up with recessions and expansions as identified
by the Business Cycle Dating Committee of the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research.
The dramatic increase in the exposure of high-income tax units to eco-
nomic fluctuations began in the early 1980s. Table 1 shows the annual-
ized percent change in average income per tax unit for all tax units, for the
top 1 percent of the distribution, and for fractional percentiles within the
top 1 percent. The ﬁnal column reports the difference (in percentage points)
between this annualized change for the top 1 percent and that for all tax
units. Since 1982 the incomes of high-income households have risen more
in booms and fallen less in recessions than the average income. Accord-
ing to the final column, since the end of the 1981–82 recession, the aver-
age income accruing to the top 1 percent of the income distribution has
moved substantially more (in percentage terms) than the overall average
in every boom and every recession, on average rising 5.0 percentage points
more per year in each boom and falling 3.7 percentage points more per
year in each recession.
Further, although one might think it natural for high incomes to be more
cyclical, this was not so in the past. In the postwar period before 1982, the
incomes of high-income households more often than not moved less (again
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3. In our analysis this seems to be an important issue only for the 1986 tax reform (top
group cyclicalities are higher in the 1980s if a tax-based measure of aggregate income is
used). For the 1993 tax reform, Goolsbee (2000) provides evidence that executives timed the
exercise of their options to take advantage of lower tax rates in 1992, thus seemingly raising
aggregate income in 1992 at the expense of income in 1993. In the NIPA data, aggregate
income growth was marginally negative from 1992 to 1993. To avoid artiﬁcially overstating
our claim about extreme growth rates for top groups, we include 1993 as a boom year in
table 1. Note, however, that Hall and Liebman (2000) argue that the high incomes in
1992 may not have been tax motivated, and they show that income shifting is not evident
in response to two tax reforms of the 1980s.
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Table 1. Changes in Real Income per Tax Unit by Income Group in Expansions 
and Recessions, 1917–2008





99.0th– 99.9th– tax units 
All tax Top 1 99.9th 99.99th Top 0.01 (percentage 
Period units percent percentile percentile percent points)
Expansions (periods with increasing aggregate personal income per tax unit)
2003–07 1.8 7.8 5.6 8.7 13.9 6.0
1991–2000 2.6 5.8 4.4 7.5 9.0 3.2
1982–89 2.2 7.9 6.0 10.7 14.3 5.7
1980–81 0.8 −2.7 −3.3 −1.3 −0.7 −3.5
1975–79 1.6 1.4 0.9 2.4 3.7 −0.2
1958–73 2.6 1.9 2.0 1.6 1.0 −0.8
1954–57 3.7 2.6 3.1 1.0 2.0 −1.1
1949–53 5.0 −0.1 0.9 −2.0 −4.1 −5.1
1947–48 1.4 4.7 3.3 8.4 7.5 3.3
1938–44 11.0 3.6 4.5 3.0 −0.7 −7.4
1933–37 8.3 9.3 9.7 9.1 7.8 1.0
1924–29 1.8 4.3 3.0 4.1 10.4 2.5
1921–23 12.1 10.3 9.9 9.7 14.1 −1.8
Recessions (periods with decreasing aggregate personal income per tax unit)
2007–08 −2.6 −8.4 −6.7 −8.9 −12.7 −5.8
2000–03 −2.3 −5.8 −4.3 −7.7 −8.3 −3.5
1989–91 −1.7 −3.5 −2.2 −6.0 −5.6 −1.8
1981–82 −1.4 2.4 0.3 4.6 15.7 3.9
1979–80 −2.7 −0.9 −1.5 −0.5 3.6 1.8
1973–75 −4.5 −2.5 −3.2 −1.2 1.9 2.0
1957–58 −1.9 −4.7 −4.3 −5.7 −6.1 −2.8
1953–54 −1.1 2.2 2.5 0.2 3.7 3.2
1948–49 −2.3 −4.1 −4.1 −5.3 −1.2 −1.8
1944–47 −5.5 −0.4 0.6 −2.6 −2.4 5.1
1937–38 −8.0 −17.7 −14.4 −22.6 −24.0 −9.7
1929–33 −9.5 −12.8 −11.8 −12.5 −17.7 −3.4
1923–24 −1.2 7.5 6.0 8.8 13.3 8.7
1917–21 −7.6 −10.5 −6.1 −13.2 −22.0 −2.9
Sources: National Income and Product Accounts data, Piketty and Saez (2003), and Saez (2010). See
the online appendix (www.brookings.edu/economics/bpea, under “Conferences and Papers”) for details.
a. Geometric annual averages calculated over the indicated period. Income is real pre-tax, pre-transfer
income excluding capital gains and per tax unit; the same measure is used to deﬁne income groups.
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war period (1947 on) up to 1982, the incomes accruing to the top 1 percent
co-moved less with the business cycle than did the income of the average
household in 9 of the 12 booms and recessions. Relative to total income
per tax unit, income accruing to the top 1 percent of tax units on average
rose by 1.2 percentage points per year less in each boom and fell by 1.1
percentage points per year less in each recession. The difference between
this period and the post-1982 period is economically large. Finally, in the
pre-1947 period, for which the data are of poorer quality and, after 1941,
inﬂuenced by wartime policies, the income accruing to the top 1 percent
does not appear systematically more or less cyclical than that of the aver-
age household.
A striking feature of this change, to which we later return, is that it coin-
cides almost exactly with the acceleration in the share of income accruing
to the highest earners documented by Piketty and Saez (2003). In their data
the income share of the top 1 percent reached its minimum at 7.7 percent in
1973, grew slightly to equal 8.0 in 1981, and then started rising rapidly to
reach 17.7 percent in 2008. The coincident timing of the increase in top
income shares and the increase in top income exposure to ﬂuctuations sug-
gests a common cause, as we discuss in sections IV and V.
4
Notice from table 1 that, consistent with an out-of-sample forecast in
Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen (2009), incomes of the top 1 percent fell
substantially more than the average income in the recent recession—at
least based on 2007–08 growth rates—with an 8.4 percent fall (again in
real per-tax-unit terms) for the top 1 percent compared with a 2.6 per-
cent fall for the average tax unit. The fall for the top 0.01 percent is even
larger, at 12.7 percent. We emphasize that these numbers exclude capital
gains and thus to a large extent are driven by wage and salary income,
which fell by 3.3 percent from 2007 to 2008 for the average tax unit, by
6.0 percent for the top 1 percent, and by 17.5 percent for the top 0.01 percent.
(We elaborate on the role of earned income for the top income groups
below.)
Hereafter we will characterize the cyclical exposure of any income group
i by a measure of its income cyclicality we call beta, which is the coefﬁcient
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4. Top income shares were also large in the prewar period, a period in which we do not
ﬁnd evidence for higher cyclicality of the incomes of the top 1 percent. Piketty and Saez
(2003) argue that different factors drove the income shares of the top 1 percent during the
period of declining inequality and during the period of increasing inequality; see our discus-
sion in section IV. See also Kuznets (1953).
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in a regression where the dependent variable is the log change in income
per member of income group i (Yi):
Beta is thus the elasticity of the income per member of group i with respect
to average income, so that if average income growth is 1 percent, we expect
the income of group i to grow by βi percent.
The top panel of table 2 presents our main findings on the change in
cyclicality in terms of beta for the top 1 percent of the distribution and
within subgroups of the top 1 percent across periods. The betas of the top
1 percent and the top 0.01 percent of tax units are 2.39 and 3.96, respec-
tively, for the post-1982 period.
5 These levels of cyclicality represent
very large increases relative to prior periods: in the periods before 1982, the
betas of all top income groups are less than 1, except for the top 0.01 per-
cent for the period 1917–47.
The second panel of table 2 shows how much more income those in the
top 1 percent and its subgroups received relative to the average household.
These ratios are calculated from the group income shares (group income
share/group size). Income per tax unit in the top groups was relatively high
in 1917–47 (income per tax unit for the top 0.01 percent was 194 times
the average income), was relatively lower in 1948–82 (65 times the aver-
age for the top 0.01 percent), and has been relatively high again since
1982 (207 times the average for the top 0.01 percent). In 2008 the top 
1 percent included all tax units with incomes above $342,000; the thresh-
old for the top 0.01 percent was $6.4 million. Average income for these
two groups was $906,000 and $17.1 million, respectively, in that year.
The different betas and the larger share of income earned by top groups
together translate into a disproportionate fraction of aggregate income
changes falling on high-income households. To estimate the average fraction
of aggregate income changes borne by a group, we regress (dollar change
in real group income per tax unit) × (group share of population)/(lagged
aggregate real income per tax unit) on the growth rate of aggregate income
per tax unit. Across all groups, the numerators sum to the total real dollar
( ) ln ln . ,, 1 11 1 ΔΔ YY it i i t it ++ + =+ + αβ ε
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5. It is worth clarifying that there is no mechanical tendency for a group to become more
exposed to the cycle as its income share increases, but in fact the opposite. In the limit, as a
group’s income becomes a larger and larger share of all income, its exposure to the aggre-
gate tends toward 1.
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Table 2. Cyclicality of Real Income per Tax Unit, by Income Group, 1917–2008a
All tax Top 1 99.0th–99.9th 99.9th–99.99th Top 0.01 
Period units percent percentile percentile percent
Income cyclicality (beta)
b
1982–2008 1.00 2.39 1.75 3.08 3.96
(0.57) (0.38) (0.80) (1.11)
1947–82 1.00 0.72 0.81 0.63 0.02
(0.20) (0.16) (0.36) (0.36)
1917–47 1.00 0.90 0.82 0.94 1.12
(0.17) (0.14) (0.20) (0.31)
Ratio of group average income to average for all tax units
1982–2008 1.0 13.6 9.2 36.2 206.6
1947–82 1.0 8.7 7.1 18.7 64.6
1917–47 1.0 15.4 10.7 42.6 194.4
Fraction of aggregate income change borne by group
c
1982–2008 1.00 0.266 0.117 0.082 0.067
(0.059) (0.024) (0.019) (0.018)
1947–82 1.00 0.056 0.046 0.010 −0.000
(0.016) (0.010) (0.007) (0.002)
Alternative measures of beta
b
Regressing group income growth on median income growth
1982–2008 0.98 2.27 1.78 2.73 3.43
(0.14) (0.77) (0.51) (1.10) (1.49)
1967–82 0.93 0.52 0.64 0.32 −0.19
(0.13) (0.25) (0.19) (0.44) (0.58)
Regressing group income growth on unemployment rate
1982–2008 −0.023 −0.058 −0.043 −0.076 −0.091
(0.004) (0.018) (0.012) (0.025) (0.035)
1948–82 −0.021 −0.015 −0.017 −0.013 −0.006
(0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.009)
Sources: Authors’ regressions using data in table 1, with additional data for median income growth and
the unemployment rate. See the online appendix for details.
a. Standard errors are in parentheses.
b. Coefﬁcient on the log growth rate of average income per tax unit for all tax units (top panel) or on the
log growth rate in median household income or on the change in the unemployment rate (bottom panels),
in a regression where the dependent variable is the log growth rate of average income per tax unit in the
indicated group.
c. Coefﬁcient on the growth rate of average aggregate income per tax unit in a regression where the
dependent variable is (change in group average income per tax unit) × (group share of population)/(lagged
aggregate average income per tax unit).
change in income per tax unit, so the regression coefﬁcients across a com-
plete set of nonintersecting groups would sum to 1. Since 1982 the fractions
of income changes borne by the top 1 percent and the top 0.01 percent are
26.6 percent and 6.7 percent—27 times and 670 times their shares in the
population—respectively (third panel of table 2).
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using other measures of aggregate ﬂuctuations. The fourth panel of table 2
measures cyclicality by beta with respect to changes in median household
income (as calculated by the Census Bureau using the CPS) and with respect
to changes in the aggregate unemployment rate. In both cases, measured
cyclicality of the top 1 percent is lower than that for all tax units in the early
period; from there it more than triples, reaching more than double that of
the average tax unit in the recent period.
Furthermore, these changes in cyclical exposure represent actual
increases in the cyclical volatility of high incomes. That is, the rise in the
cyclical exposure of the top 1 percent is much greater than the decline in
total income volatility that occurred in the Great Moderation. In the
Piketty-Saez data, the standard deviation of the log change in the average
income of the top 1 percent rose signiﬁcantly, from 0.039 during 1947–82
to 0.085 during 1982–2008; the corresponding numbers for the top 0.01 per-
cent are 0.059 and 0.155, respectively. In terms of cyclicality, the standard
deviation of the cyclical component βiΔlnYt+1, rose also for all top income
groups, as the standard deviation of ΔlnYt+1 fell only from 0.029 to 0.023, a
much smaller (percentage) fall than the rise in the βis in table 2. Thus, for
the top 1 percent, the standard deviation of the cyclical component βiΔlnYt+1
rose from 0.021 during 1947–82 to 0.055 during 1982–2008.
I.B. Wages and Salaries
To reiterate, in all of these results, the incomes of high-income groups are
measured as cash income before government transfers and taxes, and the
income changes are not contaminated by any endogenous timing of real-
izations of income reported as capital gains. That said, our results so far
include income from all other taxable sources: wage and salary income
(including bonuses and most stock options), entrepreneurial income, divi-
dends, interest, and rental incomes. We now show that our main ﬁndings are
driven to a large extent by the changing cyclicality of wage and salary
income. We also document that they are not driven by potentially endoge-
nous timing of stock options (more exercising of stock options in booms)
or solely due to people with stock options.
Table 3 shows, for the postwar period up to 1982 and the period since,
the average share of each group’s income that is from each source as
deﬁned by the IRS (top panel) and the cyclicality of each type of income
(bottom panel). This table documents three main points. First, in the period
since 1982, wage and salary income accounts for only a slightly lower
share of total income (60 percent) for the top 1 percent than for the average
JONATHAN A. PARKER and ANNETTE VISSING-JORGENSEN 13










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12367-01a_Parker_rev2.qxd  2/17/11  10:07 AM  Page 14household (two-thirds). Wages and salaries are a smaller but still signiﬁ-
cant share of income for the top 0.01 percent (40 percent).
Second, and more important, since 1982 the wage and salary income
of high-income groups is much more cyclical than that for all tax units.
To maintain comparability across types of income and in the deﬁnition of
an economic fluctuation, for all types we define cyclicality with respect
to ﬂuctuations in NIPA aggregate pre-tax, pre-transfer income excluding
capital gains per tax unit. Since 1982 the wage and salary income of the top
1 percent has a cyclicality of 2.4, and that of the top 0.01 percent a cycli-
cality of 6.2, compared with a cyclicality of less than 1 for all tax units. The
cyclicality of wage and salary income of the top 1 percent is about the same
as that of their overall income (and thus as the average cyclicality of their
other types of income), whereas the cyclicality of wage and salary income
of the top 0.01 percent exceeds that of all their other types of income.
Third, the change in cyclicality of the top 1 percent since 1982 is to a
large extent driven by the rise in the share of wages and salaries in their total
income and the change in its cyclicality, with a smaller role for increased
cyclicality of dividend and interest income. The top panel of table 3 shows
that the share of wage and salary income in the incomes of the top 1 percent
rose by 15 percentage points across periods. The bottom panel shows a dra-
matic increase in the cyclicality of the wages and salaries of the top 1 per-
cent, from 0.4 in the 1947–82 period to 2.4 in the 1982–2008 period. Across
periods there is also a substantial increase in the cyclicality of dividend and
interest income for the top 1 percent, but these two sources are smaller
shares of income. The cyclicality of entrepreneurial income for the top 1 per-
cent is relatively stable, at around 2 for both 1947–82 and 1982–2008. For
the top 0.01 percent, the change in cyclicality is more widespread across
categories, but again the largest role is played by wage and salary income.
We next investigate the role of stock options in our findings. The rise
of stock options coincides with the rise of income inequality, and the vast
majority of stock options are nonqualified options, which are treated for
tax purposes as wage and salary income when exercised.
6 Because our
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6. Qualified stock options are taxed as capital gains when exercised and the stocks
received are sold, provided that they are held for a year and that the stocks purchased with
them are held for another year. The gain resulting from the difference between the strike
price and the market price, however, can count toward income for purposes of the alter-
native minimum tax. We do not deal here with the accounting treatment of stock options
for ﬁnancial reporting, which differs from the tax treatment for the individual; for example,
it allows corporations to deduct more on their tax returns than they expense on their ﬁnancial
statements.
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qualiﬁed options in wage and salary income. We are concerned that either
endogenous timing of the exercise of stock options (if more are exercised
in booms) or a correlation between stock market performance and aggre-
gate income might make our measure of realized top incomes excessively
procyclical even if actual economic earnings were not. Thus, we address
two questions concerning options. First, is income from options sufﬁciently
prevalent in the top 1 percent to be the main driver of high wage and salary
cyclicality? Second, do we still ﬁnd high cyclicality of top incomes if we
include options in income when granted (at values determined by the Black-
Scholes model) instead of when exercised (as in the tax data)?
To address the ﬁrst question, we use the Survey of Consumer Finances
(SCF) for 1998, 2001, 2004, and 2007, which contains information on wealth
and income (for the preceding calendar year) for a stratiﬁed random sample
of households that oversamples rich households. These years of the SCF
also include the responses to two survey questions about stock options. The
ﬁrst asks whether the household received stock options during the past
year, and the second asks whether the household has a valuable asset not
otherwise recorded in the interview and then asks the household to state
what it is, with stock options being one possible response. SCF data are
not top coded, with the exception that a household is dropped if it has a net
worth greater than the least wealthy person in the Forbes list of the wealth-
iest 400 people in the United States.
7 On average across the four survey
years, only 22 percent of households in the top 1 percent of the income dis-
tribution had stock options. Furthermore, the cyclicality of income growth
(of non-capital gains income, based on aggregate income calculated from
SCF data and using 3-year real log growth rates) is around 1.8 both for
all households in the top 1 percent and for households in the top 1 percent
without stock options. This indicates that income from stock options is not
driving our main ﬁndings.
To answer the second question, we use data on executive compensation
from ExecuComp, which are available for 1992 to 2009. Our sample deﬁ-
nition is described in the online data appendix (at www.brookings.edu/
economics/bpea, under “Conferences and Papers”). The average number of
executives covered in our sample is 6,216 per year. The top panel of
table 4 shows that in these data the average total executive compensa-
tion (in real 2008 dollars) was $1.6 million in 1992 based on the value
16 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2010
7. This should not affect our results substantially, since the top 400 families correspond
to only a small fraction of even the top 0.01 percent.
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Table 4. Cyclicality of Income of Corporate Executives, 1992–2009
1992 2009
Millions of 2008 dollars
Average real total compensation
Based on value of options granted
a 1.45 2.43
Based on value of options exercised
b 1.63 2.39
Percent
Average share of total compensation by component, 




Stock grants 7.0 29.3




Cyclicality of component income growth
e
Based on value of options granted
Total compensation 2.89 0.86
Salary −0.12 0.13
Bonus 1.01 0.93
Stock grants 2.82 1.02
Option grants 5.36 1.70
Other
d 0.97 1.57
Based on value of options exercised
Total compensation 4.39 1.15
Option grants 10.86 2.24
Excluding options
Total compensation 1.01 0.62
2007–08 2008–09
Percent
Growth rate of total real compensation
Based on value of options granted −8.3 −5.3
Based on value of options exercised −20.1 −18.2
Sources: Authors’ calculations using ExecuComp data. See the online data appendix for details.
a. ExecuComp series tdc1.
b. ExecuComp series tdc2.
c. Average compensation from the indicated component divided by average total compensation.
Numbers may not sum to 100 because of rounding.
d. For example, nonequity incentive plan compensation.
e. Estimation based on log growth and excluding the 2005–06 growth rate, which may be affected by
changes in reporting requirements in 2006.
12367-01a_Parker_rev2.qxd  2/17/11  10:07 AM  Page 17of options exercised. Using the group income cutoffs in the Piketty-Saez
data, on average across 1992–2009, 81 percent of the ExecuComp execu-
tives were in the top 1 percent, and 7 percent were in the top 0.01 percent.
8
The second panel of the table shows that the executives received a sub-
stantial fraction of their income in the form of options. The table also
reports betas for each income component (calculated from annual averages
of each type of income across executives). The beta of overall compen-
sation is 2.9 based on the value of options granted, and 4.4 based on the
value of options exercised. Given that only a small fraction of those in
the top 1 percent have stock options income (according to the SCF data)
and that the beta of executive compensation based on the value of options
granted is about two-thirds that based on the value of options exercised (as
calculated from the ExecuComp data), we conclude that endogenous tim-
ing of options is not likely to have substantially affected our beta estimates
for wages and salaries using the Piketty-Saez data.
Interestingly, these findings do not imply that options are not critical
for the income cyclicality of top earners who do receive stock options.
For executives in the ExecuComp data, options income does drive the
high cyclicality of their wage and salary income: their beta of compen-
sation excluding options is around 1. That is, the cyclical component of
their income is (granted) options. For these results to be consistent with
our results from the SCF, however, it must therefore be that nonoptions
wage and salary income is highly cyclical for top earners without options.
Bonuses or other incentive pay may play a central role for these house-
holds, but our data sources (aside from ExecuComp) do not separately
break out bonuses.
A ﬁnal observation can be made from the ExecuComp data. Table 4
also shows the growth rates of real compensation for executives in this
sample for 2007–08 and 2008–09. The negative growth rates for 2007–08
of −8.3 percent and −20.1 percent (depending on which options data are
used) confirm the finding based on the data for all top 1 percent tax units
in table 1 that top income groups were hit harder by the recent recession
than the average household. For 2008–09 the executives in the Execu-
Comp data did much worse than the average tax unit (for which we esti-
mate, using NIPA data, that wage and salary income fell by 5.3 percent
18 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2010
8. With an average of 137 million tax units across 1992–2009, the top 1 percent consists
of, on average, 1,370,000 households, and the top 0.01 percent of, on average, 13,700 house-
holds. Households headed by executives represented in ExecuComp thus make up a tiny
fraction of both the top 1 percent and the top 0.01 percent.
12367-01a_Parker_rev2.qxd  2/17/11  10:07 AM  Page 18in real per-tax-unit terms) when we measure income including the value of
options exercised, but similar to the average tax unit when we use the value
of options granted.
9
I.C. Who Is in the Top 1 Percent?
To further understand what drives the higher cyclicality of income of
the top 1 percent, it is useful to document the characteristics of families
in that group and how these have changed across periods. Since this is
not feasible in the Piketty-Saez data, we use the March CPS public use
microdata files. We study the characteristics of families and their heads
for the entire population and for the top 1 percent using pre-tax, post-
transfer family income excluding capital gains.
10 Table 5 reports statis-
tics averaged across the 5 years ending in 1982 and across the 5 years
ending in 2008.
Heads of families in the top 1 percent tend to be slightly older than the
average, are more likely to be married, and are less likely to be retired.
They are more likely to be white, self-employed, and more educated. Per-
haps surprisingly, the top 1 percent are widely dispersed across indus-
tries and occupations. This makes it less likely that a particular industry
or occupation is driving most of the high cyclicality of incomes among
this group. For example, it is unlikely that the increased cyclicality of the
top 1 percent is due only to more of them being employed in ﬁnance today
than earlier, or to incomes in ﬁnancial occupations having become more
cyclical (although ﬁnance may be more important for the top 0.01 percent),
for two reasons. First, the share of the top 1 percent in ﬁnance (and related
industries) is only 16 percent even at the end of our sample period, up
by about 4.4 percentage points from the early 1980s. Therefore, whether
one assumes that the beta of incomes in the finance industry is constant
but that more of the top 1 percent are now employed in finance, or one
allows the beta of finance to increase, the beta for finance in the post-
1982 period would have to be at least 11 in order for finance to explain
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9. The more meaningful comparison here is probably the one based on value of options
exercised, since NIPA wages and salaries are based on that concept (see Moylan 2008). The
treatment of options in the NIPA is unlikely to materially affect our results, since options
income is only a tiny fraction of overall NIPA income. Furthermore, as shown in the bottom
panel of table 2, our main results are very similar when we use unemployment or median
income to measure aggregate ﬂuctuations.
10. We use this deﬁnition of income to match with previous work using the CPS, since
comparability is important for our analysis in section II.A.
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Table 5. Demographic, Educational, and Occupational Characteristics of Heads of
Families in the Top 1 Percent of the Income Distribution, 1978–82 and 2004–08a
Top 1 percentb All families
Characteristic 1978–82 2004–08 1978–82 2004–08
Units as indicated
Demographics
Average age 50.7 47.8 45.1 46.9
Percent with children under 18 37.9 50.6 51.5 46.4
Average no. of children under 18 0.7 1.0 1.0 0.9
Percent married 97.8 97.0 87.3 84.6
Percent retired 7.0 12.3 14.8 29.6
Percent white 95.9 88.3 87.6 81.7
Percent self-employed 39.4 27.8 11.6 9.1
Percent of all family heads
Education
Less than high school 5.3 1.3 30.2 12.1
High school diploma 15.6 9.8 33.2 31.3
Some college 13.7 13.0 18.0 27.5
College degree 31.6 33.1 12.3 18.6
Post-college education 33.7 42.8 6.3 10.5
Industry
Manufacturing and construction 22.0 11.8 28.3 14.9
Finance, insurance, and real estate 11.6 16.0 3.9 5.2
Professional services 24.7 41.8 11.4 23.0
Wholesale and retail trade 13.3 9.2 12.8 9.7
Other 28.4 21.3 43.5 47.1




or managerial 34.7 35.5 10.8 12.3
Professional specialty 29.6 32.1 9.4 11.6
Sales 16.0 13.1 8.3 8.4
Other 19.7 19.3 71.6 67.7
Sources: Authors’ calculations using Census public use data from the March CPS files from 1979
to 2009, referring to the previous year’s income and labor force characteristics. See the online data
appendix for details.
a. “Families” excludes people not living with someone related to them by blood or marriage. This
definition includes about 90 percent of households in the top 1 percent of the income distribution and
76 percent of households in the general population (as determined from the 1995 Survey of Consumer
Finances). Reported percentages and averages are averaged across years in the indicated period.
b. As deﬁned by CPS family income (pre-tax, post-transfer income excluding capital gains).
c. We use a common occupation coding for income years 1982–2001.
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of table 2).
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Second, to the extent we can estimate betas of the top 1 percent at the
industry or occupation level, we ﬁnd no evidence that the beta for those in
ﬁnance is dramatically larger than the betas of other top 1 percent house-
holds.
12 Jon Bakija, Adam Cole, and Bradley Heim (2010) provide data
for the top 1 percent and the top 0.1 percent that are comparable to the
data from Piketty and Saez but contain information about occupations
(coded from taxpayer responses to the occupation question on Form
1040). We use their data for 1993, 1997, 1999, and 2001–05 to calculate
log growth rates (annualized in the case of 4- or 2-year periods) and
regress these on aggregate log growth rates (using the same aggregate vari-
able we used earlier). Four occupations account for more than 5 percent
of tax units in the top 1 percent and the top 0.1 percent. These are “exec-
utives, managers, and supervisors (non-finance),” “financial professions,
including management,” “lawyers,” and “medical.” Using these data, we
estimate a beta of 1.99 for the full top 1 percent, and betas for the four
subgroups listed of 1.96, 2.34, 1.67, and 0.71. For the top 0.1 percent we
estimate a beta of 2.82 for the full group and betas of 2.27, 3.08, 3.60,
and 2.34 for the four main subgroups (all estimates listed have associated
t statistics of 2 or more). With the exception of medical occupations within
the top 1 percent, this suggests that betas are high across all the largest
subgroups of the top 1 percent and the top 0.1 percent.
I.D. Consumption
We next turn to the question of whether the high cyclicality of income
for high-income households leads to a high cyclicality of consumption
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11. We calculate this as follows. Let a′ and a denote the share of the top 1 percent
employed in ﬁnance during 1982–2008 and 1947–82, respectively, and let β′ and β denote the
income cyclicality of the top 1 percent in these two periods. If the beta of those in the top 1 per-
cent not employed in ﬁnance was constant at 1, then a′β′ + (1 − a′) = 2.4 and aβ+(1 − a) = 0.7,
and thus a′β′ − aβ−(a′−a) = 1.7. Suppose (based on table 5) that a′=0.16, and assume (to
give ﬁnance its best chance at being the explanation) that a = 0.06 (lower than the pre-1982
value from table 5). Then 0.16 ×β ′−0.06β=1.8. Consider two possible cases: If β=β ′ , then
β′ = 18. Alternatively, if β=1, then β′ = 11.6.
12. The CPS data (described in more detail in section II) are problematic for this pur-
pose because values assigned to top-coded observations are not industry speciﬁc, implying
that betas for top 1 percent households across industries could spuriously look similar. With
that important reservation, we ﬁnd that within each of the four industries listed in table 5,
betas for families in the top 1 percent are much larger than for the average family, and the
top 1 percent ﬁnance industry beta is roughly similar to that for the nonﬁnance industries
taken as a group.
12367-01a_Parker_rev2.qxd  2/17/11  10:07 AM  Page 21spending. Evidence on this question constitutes a further test of our main
ﬁnding, as well as of the extent to which consumption is smoothed across
these income changes, as would be the case for insurable changes in income
or endogenous timing of income. Unfortunately, high-income groups are
generally thought to be underrepresented in the Consumer Expenditure Sur-
vey (CE), and some CE consumption categories are top coded.
13 Further-
more, in order to have a sufﬁcient number of households, our analysis here
focuses on the top 5 percent of CE households rather than the top 1 percent.
Nonetheless, our analysis shows higher cyclicality for high-consumption
households.
We use the CE data to construct measures of household-level spend-
ing from January 1982 to February 2009 for different groups ranked by
their expenditure level in the quarter before the interview. Our consump-
tion measure is nondurables plus some services; the main categories of
excluded services are health care, education, and housing (except for the
nondurable and service components of household operations). We deﬂate
the reported consumption values using the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS) price index for nondurables. For each household we calculate log-
consumption growth rates from one quarter to the next and average these
across households in a given group (using survey weights). We then calcu-
late annual log growth rates by summing four quarterly log growth rates.
For each group we run a time-series regression of the four-quarter log
growth rates in consumption per household on the log growth rate of one
of four different series (in separate regressions): NIPA pre-tax, pre-transfer
income; NIPA disposable (that is, post-tax, post-transfer) income; NIPA
personal consumption expenditures (PCE) on nondurables and services;
and CE average consumption for all households (using our consumption
definition). For comparability across regressions in table 6 and for com-
parability with the earlier tables, the ﬁrst three regressions all use the same
price deﬂator, the CPI series from Piketty and Saez, whereas the regres-
sion with CE average consumption as the explanatory variable uses the
BLS deﬂator (since both the left- and the right-hand-side variable are
based on the same consumption measure).
Table 6 shows that the sensitivity of the consumption of households
in the top 5 percent of the distribution (ranked by initial consumption) to
22 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2010
13. Because of the way the CE is structured, the respondent’s burden rises with expen-
diture: more time is required to report more expenditure. Further, there is evidence that
underreporting rises with expenditure. See, for example, Aguiar and Bils (2010).
12367-01a_Parker_rev2.qxd  2/17/11  10:07 AM  Page 22aggregate income fluctuations is between 1.9 and 2.6, depending on the
income measure used, whereas the sensitivity to aggregate consumption
ﬂuctuations is almost 5.
14 This compares with a sensitivity of the consump-
tion of the full set of CE households that is substantially less than 1 with
respect to NIPA incomes.
The implications of this higher cyclicality are borne out in the expendi-
ture response of high-consumption households to the recent deep recession.
Figure 1 shows that CE consumption in the recent recession fell sub-
stantially more for high-expenditure households—more than 10 percent
from 2007 to 2008—than the average for all households. This finding is
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14. The sensitivities of top household consumption to NIPA consumption are a bit lower
than similar statistics for a shorter sample reported in Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen (2009).
The difference is due not to differences in the samples, but rather to the price index used:
Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen (2009) used a PCE deﬂator to deﬂate NIPA consumption,
whereas the results reported here use the CPI series from Piketty and Saez.
Table 6. Cyclicality of Real Consumption among All Households and the Top 5 Percent,
January 1982–February 2009a
All Top 5 
Measure households percent
Ratio of group average consumption to average consumption  1.00 2.52
of all households
Beta from regression of consumption on:
b
NIPA pre-tax, pre-transfer personal income 0.58 1.94
(0.14) (0.50)
NIPA post-tax, post-transfer personal income 0.61 2.60
(0.23) (0.61)
NIPA nondurables and services consumption 1.17 4.80
(0.27) (0.97)
CE consumption for all households 1.00 2.38
(0.30)
Fraction of total CE consumption ﬂuctuations borne by group
c 1.00 0.32
(0.04)
Sources: Authors’ calculations and regressions using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE).
a. Consumption includes expenditure on nondurable goods and some services. Groups are deﬁned
based on their consumption in the previous survey interview. Changes for all variables in all regressions
are measured as 4-quarter log growth rates. Standard errors are in parentheses.
b. Each beta is the coefﬁcient on the log change in the indicated aggregate in a regression where the
dependent variable is the log change in consumption per household in the indicated group.
c. Coefﬁcient on the growth rate of aggregate CE consumption per household in a regression where the
dependent variable is (change in group average consumption per household) × (group share of population)/
(lagged aggregate average consumption per household).
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15. For better readability, the figure focuses on annual data, calculated as within-year
averages (using survey weights) of quarterly consumption values across households in a
given group (multiplied by 4). Furthermore, because we are interested in showing levels of
growth rates, not only their betas with respect to aggregates, we sort households according
to current consumption rather than consumption in the previous quarter. The latter method
is theoretically more meaningful but, with measurement error in consumption, leads to a
mechanical negative bias in growth rates for top groups. As discussed in Parker and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2009), this does not affect the estimation of betas when log growth rates are used,
but it would bias this ﬁgure.
Figure 1. Cumulative Change in Log Real Expenditure per Household, 2005–09a
Log points
Source: Authors’ calculations using Consumer Expenditure Survey data for 2005 to February 2009.
a. Annual values are within-year averages (using survey weights) of quarterly consumption (multiplied by 4).
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consistent with the out-of-sample forecast in Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2009).15
These results provide additional evidence that the high cyclicality of top
incomes is not due to the endogenous timing of compensation but instead
affects the standard of living for top income households. We emphasize,
however, that a given percent decline in expenditure presumably has greater
welfare implications for a low-expenditure household than for a high-
expenditure household. This point, along with the lack of foundation for
interpersonal welfare comparisons, suggests that one should not conclude
that high-income households suffer more from recessions than do low-
income households.
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incomes. This increase occurs for total (non-capital gains) income as
well as for wage and salary income alone, and top groups’ expenditures
are also highly cyclical during the post-1982 period. Furthermore, the top
1 percent are active in a wide range of industries and occupations, mak-
ing it less likely that a particular industry or occupation is driving most
of the high cyclicality of top groups’ incomes.
II. Cyclicalities across the Full Income Distribution and 
the Impact of Transfers, Taxes, and Capital Gains
In this section we use data on the entire distribution of incomes across house-
holds to reconcile our findings with the conventional wisdom that low-
income households are the most affected by booms and recessions and that
this greater sensitivity is due to higher cyclicality of hours worked among
this group. Further, in studying the entire distribution, we also character-
ize how the tax-and-transfer system changes the cyclicality of take-home
income. Finally, we track individual families rather than the income distri-
bution across years as an alternative to using repeated cross-sectional data.
II.A. Relating Our Findings to the Conventional Wisdom
Previous studies have shown that the incomes of low-income house-
holds are more cyclical because unemployment falls primarily on low-wage
workers (Clark and Summers 1981, Kydland 1984), whereas the wages of
low-wage households have approximately the same exposure to the busi-
ness cycle as those of high-wage households (Solon, Barsky, and Parker
1994). The flip side is that economic booms raise the standard of living
of low-income households by more than they do high-income households
(Card and Blank 1993, Hines, Hoynes, and Krueger 2001). Rebecca Blank
(1989, p. 142), for example, concludes that “the income distribution nar-
rows in times of economic expansion.” There are three reasons why the
conventional wisdom might not have detected the high cyclicality of top
incomes: first, the time period, since high-income cyclicality began to
rise only in the 1980s; second, the focus on broad groups, since cyclicality
is high only for the very top of the distribution; and third, the top coding
of incomes in conventional survey datasets, since this masks changes in
income at the top end of the income distribution.
To begin, we track income groups using the March CPS public use
microdata files for 1968–2008. The definition of income is the standard
Census deﬁnition, namely, pre-tax, post-transfer income excluding capital
JONATHAN A. PARKER and ANNETTE VISSING-JORGENSEN 25
12367-01a_Parker_rev2.qxd  2/17/11  10:07 AM  Page 25gains, and the unit of observation is a Census-deﬁned family.16 We drop
changes across years with major top code changes, and we note that after
1996 the data report the mean income for families above the top-coded
amount, whereas before they simply report the income top code amount in
place of actual income when top coded.
Following some of the earlier literature, the top panel of table 7 shows
the cyclicality of incomes of low-education families (which are typically
also lower-income families) and high-education families (typically higher-
income families). Families are categorized according to the characteris-
tics of the head, and we examine cyclicality with respect to average CPS
income and the NIPA pre-tax, pre-transfer income (excluding capital gains)
measure used in the earlier tables. Even during the period from 1982 on,
there is some evidence that the conventional facts about cyclicality hold
in that low-education households are more exposed to economic fluctu-
ations than high-education households.
Turning to the top 1 percent, we show in the sixth column of table 7 that
from 1968 to 1982, incomes in the top 1 percent of the distribution in the
CPS were less cyclical than the average, with a beta of roughly 0.6. Thus,
the previous literature is entirely correct about the early part of the period
it studies. But when one focuses on the top 1 percent in the period since
1982 (next column), the cyclicality of that group’s income is estimated to
be 1.97 or 1.00, depending on the measure of income used—estimates as
large as those for families with less than a high school education. The
higher top 1 percent cyclicality after 1982 is presumably due to the later
period, to increases in the top code level at several points over the years,
and, after 1996, to the increased variability in amounts reported for top-
coded observations.
Finally, we use a measure of the top 1 percent income share in the CPS
constructed by Burkhauser and others (2008, 2009) using internal Census
Bureau data for the CPS. These data measure top 1 percent income shares
more accurately than is possible with the top-coded, publicly released micro-
data because the internal data are subject only to high-end censoring due to
the number of digits allocated to the internally recorded income variable.
That said, there are a number of additional issues with the accuracy of inter-
nal CPS top income data, and the series of Burkhauser and coauthors does
26 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2010
16. This deﬁnition has the beneﬁt of dropping households consisting of unrelated indi-
viduals, but the disadvantage of dropping single individuals without children. The latter
account for only about 10 percent of households in the top 1 percent, but 24 percent of the
general population, according to the 1995 SCF.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12367-01a_Parker_rev2.qxd  2/17/11  10:07 AM  Page 27not show as signiﬁcant an increase in top income shares as the tax data (see
Burkhauser and others 2008, 2009, and Atkinson and others 2010). Despite
these caveats, as displayed in the last two columns of table 7, these internal
CPS survey data show an even higher cyclicality of the top 1 percent than
the public data, and one that is very similar to that of the Piketty-Saez data
from table 3.
17
The previous literature, furthermore, shows that the cyclicality of the
incomes of low-income families is largely due to the cyclicality of their
hours worked. We now show that hours cyclicality plays only a minor role
for the cyclicality of the top 1 percent. First, using all families in the CPS,
we calculate average usual hours worked per week in each year for differ-
ent income groups. For each group we regress the change in log average
hours on the change in log real NIPA income (pre-tax, pre-transfer income,
excluding capital gains), using data for 1982–2008. The cyclicality of hours
for the top 1 percent is 0.26 (but with a standard error of 0.30), which is
similar to the cyclicality of hours for all families, which we estimate to
be 0.22 (with a standard error of 0.06). Thus, although the results are weak
statistically, there is no evidence of a different cyclicality in hours for the
top 1 percent. Second, we use the CPS hours data to adjust our measure
of the wage and salary income of the top 1 percent from the Piketty-Saez
data. We regress log growth in wages and salaries on log growth in hours
and use the residual in place of the original wage and salaries series in
our analysis of cyclicality. The cyclicality of “hours-adjusted” wages and
salaries is estimated to be 2.2 for the top 1 percent, only slightly lower than
the cyclicality of the unadjusted series, which is 2.4 (table 3). A similar
exercise for the bottom quintile (using merged SOI-CPS data on the bottom
quintile’s income, as described in the next subsection) ﬁnds that most of the
cyclicality for that group is in fact due to the cyclicality of hours worked,
consistent with the previous literature.
18 Our analysis implies that, in con-
trast with the bottom end of the distribution, most of the cyclicality of the
28 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2010
17. To use these data, which report “true” (internal CPS) income shares, we infer the
missing amount of income of the top 1 percent (denoted x) and thus also the missing
amount from total income in the public CPS (denoted Y) from the relationship (Y + x) ×
(internal CPS income share) = (Y
1% + x), where Y
1% is the total income of the top 1 per-
cent of families in the public data. Burkhauser and others (2010) provide two series for
the internal CPS top 1 percent income share, one based on households and one based on
tax units. Since neither matches our choice of CPS unit of analysis perfectly, we show
results based on both.
18. Castro and Coen-Pirani (2008) provide further analysis of the cyclicality of hours,
focusing on a comparison of college-educated with non-college-educated individuals.
12367-01a_Parker_rev2.qxd  2/17/11  10:07 AM  Page 28top 1 percent is due to ﬂuctuating payments for work rather than ﬂuctuating
hours worked.
We conclude that our results on income cyclicality both by education
group in the CPS and for the top 1 percent before 1982 support the conven-
tional view that low incomes are more cyclical. However, after 1982, even
in this conventional survey dataset which has top-coded incomes, high
income cyclicality is observable for the top 1 percent, and even higher cycli-
cality can be measured from versions of the data not subject to the top cod-
ing imposed on the public release ﬁles. Furthermore, this high cyclicality
does not appear to be driven by cyclicality in hours worked, as it is for the
bottom income groups. We now turn to a dataset from the Congressional
Budget Ofﬁce (CBO) that combines information from the CPS and the
SOI data and allows us to study the entire distribution of income without
the confounding issues of top coding.
II.B. Cyclicalities across the Full Income Distribution
To study the complete income distribution, this subsection employs a
dataset from the Congressional Budget Office (2008) that merges data
from the IRS SOI and data from the CPS to estimate average household
income for different groups of households in different years. The two
most important differences between the SOI-CPS data from the Con-
gressional Budget Office and the SOI data used in tables 1, 2, and 3 are
the unit of analysis and the definition of income used to sort households.
The unit of analysis is the household in the SOI-CPS data and a tax unit
in the SOI data. In terms of income, in the SOI-CPS data, households are
sorted on pre-tax income per effective householder including transfers and
capital gains, whereas in the Piketty-Saez SOI data, tax units are sorted
on pre-tax income excluding transfers and capital gains. Our online data
appendix provides further details.
The SOI-CPS data confirm our earlier findings for top income groups
for this different set of choices about income measurement and unit of
analysis. Table 8 shows statistics on the income distribution and cyclicality
across the first four quintiles, in detail for the top quintile, and then in
further detail for the top 1 percent. Focusing first on wages and salaries
and on pre-tax, pre-transfer income excluding capital gains, as in all our
analysis up to this point, we find (top panel) that the top 1 percent in the
SOI-CPS data earn about 11 times, and the top 0.01 percent about 150 times,
the average income; both these results are fairly similar to those reported
in the second panel of table 2. The second panel of table 8 shows that all
household groupings except the top 1 percent get 60 to 70 percent of their
JONATHAN A. PARKER and ANNETTE VISSING-JORGENSEN 29














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12367-01a_Parker_rev2.qxd  2/17/11  10:07 AM  Page 31income from wages and salaries. This number drops to 44 percent for the
top 1 percent, and 27 percent for the top 0.01 percent.
19 The ﬁrst two rows
of the third panel conﬁrm our main ﬁndings on the post-1982 cyclicality of
top income groups (compare this panel with the second panel of table 3).
For the top 1 percent, both wages and salaries and overall pre-tax, pre-
transfer income (excluding capital gains) per householder are more than
twice as cyclical as the average income of all households, and for house-
holds in the top 0.01 percent, both wages and salaries and overall income
are more than three times as cyclical as the average.
20
Second, the first two rows of the third panel of table 8 show that the
incomes of households in the bottom two quintiles are a bit more cycli-
cal than those of households from the middle quintile up to the 90th to
95th percentile. Thus, even in this period of high exposure of very high
income groups, households in the lowest income quintile still have a
slightly higher cyclicality of income than households in the middle and
upper-middle parts of the distribution, but a much lower cyclicality than
those at the top end.
21
In sum, the recent cyclicality of wages and salaries and pre-tax, pre-
transfer income is asymmetrically U-shaped, higher for the bottom two
quintiles than for the middle and upper-middle part of the income distribu-
tion, and dramatically higher for the top 1 percent and the top 0.01 percent.
II.C. Cyclicality and Transfers, Taxes, and Capital Gains
The different levels and cyclicalities of the incomes of different groups
in the income distribution lead to different levels and cyclicalities of taxes
and transfers, and therefore different cyclicalities of disposable income
and ultimately of consumption. In this section we document that taxes and
transfers reduce the cyclicality of income except at the very top. We also
investigate the role of capital gains.
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19. The somewhat smaller role of wages for the top groups than in the top panel of
table 3 is probably due to the fact that households in the SOI-CPS data are sorted by an
income measure that includes capital gains.
20. For comparability with earlier tables, the right-hand-side variable in this panel is
(as in tables 1, 2, and 3) the log growth rate in real NIPA pre-tax, pre-transfer income per tax
unit, excluding capital gains. The alternative would be to use the aggregate income from the
SOI-CPS data. This leads to similar results.
21. The cyclicality of the bottom quintile in the SOI-CPS data is not as high as one
might have expected from the cyclicality of low-education households in the CPS. When
using CPS data with families sorted on income rather than education, we find a cyclicality
for the bottom quintile in the CPS that is similar to that found for the bottom quintile in the
SOI-CPS data.
12367-01a_Parker_rev2.qxd  2/17/11  10:07 AM  Page 32First, the top two panels of table 8 show that adding transfers to our def-
inition of income raises the incomes of the lowest quintile substantially but
makes only a small difference to the incomes further up the distribution;
the ratio of top income to average income falls slightly, since aggregate
income is higher when transfers are included. Next, adding capital gains to
income works the same way at the other end of the distribution, increasing
the incomes of the top groups and so raising their relative incomes, while
lowering the relative incomes of the bottom groups. Finally, subtracting
taxes lowers the incomes of the top groups the most and so raises the rel-
ative incomes of the bottom quintiles.
Second, the third panel of table 8 shows that the income cyclicalities of
the bottom income groups are signiﬁcantly reduced by transfers, which are
large for the bottom quintile (about 40 percent of pre-tax, pre-transfer, pre-
capital gains income) and countercyclical. The cyclicality of income for the
bottom quintile falls from 0.76 to 0.41 as a result of transfer income alone,
and that of the second quintile falls from 0.90 to 0.61. Third, capital gains
increase cyclicality for all groups, and the importance of capital gains rises
steadily with income, corresponding to the larger fraction of income com-
ing from capital gains for higher-income groups. Including capital gains
raises the income cyclicality of the top 1 percent from 2.2 to 3.3.
22 Finally,
taxes modestly lower the cyclicality of income for groups below the 99th
percentile, while increasing cyclicality for the top 1 percent.
The fourth panel of table 8 summarizes the impact of different income
levels and cyclicalities by calculating the fraction of aggregate income
changes borne by each group. On average, the top 1 percent bears 29 per-
cent of changes in aggregate pre-tax, pre-transfer income excluding capital
gains, and as much as 48 percent of changes in aggregate post-tax, post-
transfer income including capital gains.
23
Overall, the cyclicality of the middle income groups is more stable
across different income measures than that of the top and bottom of the
income distribution. The cyclicality of the lowest income groups is signif-
icantly reduced by transfers, and that of the top income groups is signiﬁ-
cantly raised by including realized capital gains.
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22. Notice that the betas reported in the third panel of table 8 are all with respect to
aggregate pre-tax, pre-transfer income excluding capital gains.
23. In order for these fractions to sum to 1 across groups, we base aggregate income
changes on aggregates from the SOI-CPS data themselves. To avoid potential biases in our
estimates of betas from having SOI-based data on both the left- and the right-hand side of
the regression, we omit the growth rates for the years around the 1986 tax reform (1985–86,
1986–87, and 1987–88).
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So far, because we use datasets that have good coverage of the top end
of the income distribution, our analysis measures the cyclicality of the
average income of the top 1 percent of the income distribution rather than
the cyclicality of a given set of tax units or households. The top 1 percent
of the distribution contains somewhat different people from year to year.
Could the cyclicality of the change in incomes of the group of people that
start in the top 1 percent be different from the cyclicality of the distribution
that we have estimated so far? Such a difference could arise, for example,
from a correlation between individual income risks and aggregate ﬂuctua-
tions. We have already provided, in our consumption analysis in section
I.D, some evidence of high cyclicality in data covering a constant set of
households from one period to the next. Here we further investigate the
cyclicality of same-family income in two ways.
First, we link families across our March CPS extracts (which we also
used in section II.A) for 1982–2009. In each year we categorize families
into percentiles based on the entire distribution of families, and then we
take the subsample of those that can be tracked to the following survey
year and calculate the change in average income for each income group
from this set of families. Thus, we calculate the annual log change in aver-
age income for groups of families that, in the ﬁrst year of the change, are
all within a certain part of the income distribution. Because of the small
number of families in the top 1 percent that can be linked across years,
the standard errors of the cyclicalities estimated for the top 1 percent in
regressions parallel to those in table 7 are very large, around 1.6. For the
top 5 percent, the sample is larger and the standard errors are somewhat
smaller. The cyclicalities of same-family incomes for the top 5 percent
are estimated to be 1.46, with a standard error of 0.80, with respect to
average CPS income and 0.80, with a standard error of 0.86, with respect
to NIPA income.
Second, in the next section we turn to tax data in which we can track the
same families over time. Doing so requires using tax data from another
country, but one that has also had an increase in top income inequality.
We can summarize the main results of sections II.A through II.D as
follows: First, it is harder to observe high income cyclicality in the top 
1 percent in the public use CPS data, because of top coding and the fact
that cyclicality is high only for very high income families. Second, in
looking at the entire distribution of incomes, the cyclicality of pre-tax, pre-
transfer incomes excluding capital gains is asymmetrically U-shaped: it is
slightly higher for the bottom two quintiles of the income distribution
34 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2010
12367-01a_Parker_rev2.qxd  2/17/11  10:07 AM  Page 34than for the next groups up to around the 95th percentile (and even up to
the 99th percentile when focusing on wages and salaries), and very high
for the top 1 percent and especially the top 0.1 and 0.01 percent. Third,
transfers signiﬁcantly reduce cyclicality at the bottom of the income distri-
bution, essentially equating cyclicality across the distribution except for the
top. The realization of capital gains raises the cyclicality of incomes at the
very top even higher; taxes generate a small additional increase in cyclical-
ity at the top.
III. Canada
Saez and Michael Veall (2007) show that Canada has also had a large
increase in income inequality at the high end of the income distribution
that roughly coincides temporally with the U.S. increase but is slightly
less extreme. Canada has a slightly different tax system and culture but
presumably is affected by the same changes in economic factors, such
as technology and trade, as the United States. Thus, to provide another
observation on the cyclicality of top incomes and to provide information
about possible causes, we analyze the cyclicality of Canadian top incomes.
There are also a number of ways in which the Canadian data are better
than the U.S. data, most notably in that we can track the same families
across years.
Our data come from the Longitudinal Administrative Databank, which
contains records for 20 percent of all tax returns ﬁled in Canada from 1982
to 2007. Working with Statistics Canada, we extracted information on the
average incomes of families in different groups in the income distribution,
both as repeated cross sections and tracking the families in different groups
in the income distribution in a given year into the following year, as we
were able to do with a subset of the CPS.
24 Further, we obtained data on
income by source, as in the SOI data from Piketty and Saez, and on taxes
and transfers, as in the SOI-CPS data from the CBO. We asked Statistics
Canada to rank households and construct groups based on income calcu-
lated from pre-tax, pre-transfer income excluding capital gains.
Table 9 summarizes our results on the cyclicality of pre-tax, pre-transfer
income excluding capital gains for different income groups in Canada
with respect to aggregate Canadian income ﬂuctuations for both sampling
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24. The Canadian tax system is based on the individual, so tracking families involves
summing income across family members (legal and common law spouses and children) if
more than one live at the same address.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12367-01a_Parker_rev2.qxd  2/17/11  10:07 AM  Page 37procedures (same households from year to year, and not). First, focusing
on wages and salaries and pre-tax, pre-transfer income excluding capital
gains, the top panel of table 9 shows (comparing with table 2) that the ratio
of income of the top 1 percent to average income is somewhat lower in
Canada than in the United States, although this point should be qualified
by possible differences in tax laws and tax avoidance by high-income
households between the two countries.
25
Second, comparison of the second panel of table 9 with table 3 shows
that the top 1 percent in Canada and in the United States get similar shares
(about 60 percent) of their income from wages and salaries. However, in
Canada the top 0.01 percent get about 70 percent of their income from
wages and salaries, compared with only 40 percent in the United States
(from table 3).
Third, turning to our main point of interest, the third panel of table 9
shows that top incomes in Canada, as in the United States, are highly
cyclical in the period since 1982. In Canada the top 1 percent and the top
0.01 percent have cyclicalities of 1.6 and 3.0 in the recent period, slightly
lower than the corresponding cyclicalities in the United States (top panel
of table 2), which are 2.4 and 4.0, respectively. The next two sections
argue that this pattern across the two counties—higher cyclicality for those
at the top of the income distribution—is representative of a close relation-
ship and potentially a common cause of both high income shares and high
cyclicality at the top in the period since the early 1980s.
Fourth, table 9 also shows the effect of capital gains, taxes, and transfers
in Canada. Looking across rows in the third panel reveals that in Canada
the government has little effect on the cyclicality of incomes at the top of
the distribution. At the bottom, however, the effect of transfers is far
larger in Canada than in the United States (table 8). The beta for the low-
est income quintile before taxes and transfers is over 6, compared with
0.76 for the United States, whereas that after transfers is 0.36, quite sim-
ilar to the 0.41 in the U.S. data. Although one might be tempted to credit
the Canadian welfare state, it seems unlikely that the United States and
Canada are truly so different in the exposure of pre- versus post-transfer
incomes. Instead, the large impact of transfers on the cyclicality of the bot-
tom group in Canada is likely due to very low average pre-tax, pre-transfer
38 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2010
25. We compare the Canadian data with our results in tables 2 and 3 rather than table 8
because tables 2 and 3 (like the Canadian data) are based on sorting households using pre-
tax, pre-transfer income excluding capital gains, whereas the data underlying table 8 are
available only sorting households using pre-tax, post-transfer incomes including capital
gains.
12367-01a_Parker_rev2.qxd  2/17/11  10:07 AM  Page 38incomes for this group (with very low average incomes, even moderate
transfers can change the cyclicality substantially). Lower pre-tax, pre-
transfer incomes for the bottom group in Canada are due in large measure
to the Canadian groups being deﬁned in terms of an income measure that
excludes transfers, and to the SOI-CPS data in table 8 excluding house-
holds with negative income from the bottom income category.
Finally, the bottom panel of table 9 shows that in Canada the income
changes from one year to the next that occur for those households who are
in the top 1 percent in the ﬁrst year also have a high cyclicality with
respect to changes in aggregate Canadian income, roughly similar to
that found in the third panel using repeated cross-sectional data. This is
something we could not observe in the U.S. tax data. Thus, the cyclical
exposure from one year to the next for families that start in the top 1 per-
cent of the income distribution (but who may fall elsewhere in the dis-
tribution in subsequent years) is similar to the cyclical exposure of the
annually reported top 1 percent of the income distribution (a group that
contains somewhat different families from year to year). This is less so,
however, for the top 0.01 percent. The three groups of families that start
in the various income groups within the top 1 percent (bottom panel) have
similar cyclicalities, whereas for the same three groups in the annually
reported top 1 percent of the distribution (third panel), the top 0.01 percent
have (economically) signiﬁcantly higher cyclicality than the other two
groups. Nonetheless, the fact that we estimate high cyclicalities for the top
1 percent in both cross-sectional data and panel data is evidence against
the hypothesis that the cyclicality of top incomes in panel data in the
United States would be quite different from what we have estimated from
repeated cross-sectional data. To conclude our discussion of the bottom
panel of table 9, we note that the roles of taxes, transfers, and capital
gains are broadly similar to those in the third panel.
IV. The Empirical Link between Income Cyclicality and
Income Shares at the Top
Having explored in detail the rise in the cyclicality of high incomes in the
last three decades, we now show that this increase is closely related to the
rise in the share of income accruing to the top of the income distribution.
Speciﬁcally, we present three pieces of evidence that the higher the level of
income inequality, the higher the income cyclicality of the rich. We exploit
variation across groups, time, and countries. First, in the post-1982 period,
the higher a group is in the income distribution (within the top 1 percent),
JONATHAN A. PARKER and ANNETTE VISSING-JORGENSEN 39
12367-01a_Parker_rev2.qxd  2/17/11  10:07 AM  Page 39the higher is that group’s income cyclicality. Second, across decades, 
as the income share of a given top group increases, the cyclicality of its
income increases, consistent with the fact that the increase in the income
share of the top 1 percent starts at almost exactly the same time as the
increase in the income cyclicality of that group. Third, across countries,
those with larger increases in the income share of the top 1 percent have
experienced larger increases in the income cyclicality of the top 1 percent.
This tight empirical link between inequality and cyclicality at the top end
of the income distribution in the past quarter century strongly suggests that
these two phenomena share a common cause.
Before we turn to this evidence, ﬁgure 2 complements the basic facts
displayed in tables 1 and 2 by plotting the income shares from the Piketty-
Saez data.
26 These data show both that the dramatic rise in top income
shares started in the early 1980s, when cyclicality also increased, and that
cyclicality and the income share of the top income groups are not linked in
the ﬁrst half of the 20th century. Top income shares were large in the pre-
war period, a period in which we do not ﬁnd evidence of higher cyclicality
of the incomes of the top 1 percent. Piketty and Saez (2003) argue that
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26. As in tables 1, 2, and 3, these shares are for income excluding capital gains, and the
data come from Piketty and Saez (2003) as updated in Saez (2010).
Percent of total incomea
Source: Piketty and Saez (2003), updated by Saez (2010).
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period of declining inequality than during the later period of increasing
inequality. They argue that the decline in the income share of the top 1 per-
cent, and of the highest-income groups within the top 1 percent, from
around 1928 to around 1970 was driven in large part by declines in capital
income (income from dividends and interest), which were in turn due to a
combination of the Great Depression and the large tax increases enacted to
ﬁnance the war; these included large increases in corporate income taxes
that almost mechanically reduced distributions to stockholders. In contrast,
an increase in wage and salary income is the key driver of the more recent
increase in the income share of the top 1 percent. The lack of correspon-
dence between top 1 percent income share and income cyclicality together
with the different income composition in the earlier period suggests that
the decline in top income shares from 1928 to 1970 was not driven by the
same factors as the more recent increases. This is consistent with our
explanation for the recent changes: the ICT revolution did not happen in
reverse in the early to middle part of the 20th century.
Our ﬁrst piece of additional evidence of a link between the cyclicality
and the income shares of the top 1 percent is that, for groups further up the
income distribution within the top 1 percent, there is both a larger income
share (relative to the size of the group) and a larger income cyclicality dur-
ing the period since 1982. Figure 3 graphs the cyclicality of income over
the period 1982–2008 for each income group (using data from tables 2
and 3 and the same calculations for other income groups) against the time-
series average of the log ratio of that group’s average income to the aver-
age income of all tax units.
27 The ﬁrst panel of ﬁgure 3 focuses on pre-tax,
pre-transfer income excluding capital gains, and since we argue that the
high cyclicality of wage and salary income is a key driver of the high over-
all cyclicality of the incomes of the top 1 percent, the second panel focuses
on wage and salary income alone. It is apparent from both graphs that
groups higher up in the income distribution within the top 1 percent have
both higher ratios of income to average income and higher income cycli-
cality. Inequality at the top is extreme: the incomes of the top 0.01 per-
cent are on average 212 times the average income (see the second panel of
table 2). Similarly, cyclicality at the top is extreme: that of the top 0.01 per-
cent is about four times that of the average (six times when one focuses on
JONATHAN A. PARKER and ANNETTE VISSING-JORGENSEN 41
27. The betas depicted are from table 3 and are based on growth rates for 1983–2008.
The average log income ratios are calculated as the time-series average of the log income
ratio (average group income for the year to average income for all tax units for that year),
using income ratios for the initial year of each growth rate used (1982–2007).
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income inequality and income cyclicality.
A simple statistical description of the relationship is that β in equation 1
is a function of the average log income ratio: βi =λ 0 +λ 1(1/T)Σ ln(Yi,t/Yt),
where the summation is across the T years for each income group i, so that
equation 1 becomes
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Pre-tax, pre-transfer income excluding capital gains
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Piketty and Saez (2003), extended by Saez (2010).
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Figure 3. Betas and Log Ratios of Group Income to Average Income, by Income Group,
1982–2008
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95–99, 99–99.9, 99.9–99.99, and 99.99–100 using the growth rates for
1983–2008, for a total of 156 observations. Using pre-tax, pre-transfer
income excluding capital gains results in an estimate of λ1 of 0.65. Using
wage and salary data results in an estimate of λ1 of 1.61. Both estimates
are signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level, showing that cyclicality increases with
income share across groups.
Second, over time since top income shares first began to rise, as a
group’s income share has increased, so has its cyclicality. To show this, we
estimate betas for each high-income group and decade since the 1970s, and
the time-series average of the log ratio of that group’s average income to
the average income of all tax units for each group and decade. Figure 4
plots decadal betas against decadal average log income ratios. Again the
top panel focuses on pre-tax, pre-transfer income excluding capital gains,
and the second panel on wage and salary income. For each group, both cycli-
calities and average log income ratios increase over time, leading to a pos-
itive association between a group’s cyclicality and its average income ratio.
This pattern is present both in overall income and in wage and salary
income. Notice that when one connects the points by decade, as is done in
ﬁgure 4, rather than by group, it becomes clear that the relationship between
average log incomes and cyclicalities is strengthening over time: no relation-
ship was apparent in the 1970s, whereas a strong relationship is observed
in the 2000s.
A statistical description of the relationship underlying figure 4 is that
β in equation 1 is a function of the log income ratio, now allowing for
time-series variation in the ratio, so βi =λ 0 +λ 1ln(Yi,t/Yt). Equation 1 then
becomes
We estimate this relationship separately for each of the three subgroups of
the top 1 percent—percentiles 99–99.9, 99.9–99.99, and 99.99–100—using
the growth rates for 1970–2008. We include ln(Yi,t/Yt) itself as an addi-
tional regressor to avoid potentially spurious significance of the variable
of interest, ΔlnYt+1ln(Yi,t/Yt). Using pre-tax, pre-transfer income excluding
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12367-01a_Parker_rev2.qxd  2/17/11  10:07 AM  Page 43capital gains results in estimates of λ1 of 2.09 (t = 1.75) for percentiles
99–99.9, 2.37 (t = 2.01) for percentiles 99.9–99.99, and 2.48 (t = 2.35) for
percentiles 99.99–100. Using wage and salary data results in estimates of λ1
of 1.46 (t = 2.25), 2.86 (t = 2.31), and 3.03 (t = 2.60) for the three groups,
respectively. This conﬁrms, using time-series variation in income shares
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Beta
Pre-tax, pre-transfer income excluding capital gains
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Piketty and Saez (2003), extended by Saez (2010).
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Figure 4. Betas and Log Ratios of Group Income to Average Income across Decadesa
12367-01a_Parker_rev2.qxd  2/17/11  10:07 AM  Page 44(log income ratios) within groups, that higher income shares are associated
with higher cyclicality.
Third, we show that the countries with the largest increases in the income
shares of the top 1 percent also have experienced the largest increases in
the cyclicality of incomes of that group. We use the dataset constructed
from tax records from Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez (2010), which contains
annual time-series data for the incomes of the top 1 percent for 22 countries.
We focus on relating changes in top income shares to changes in top
income cyclicality rather than on post-1982 levels of each variable, because
of the differences in tax systems across countries and the consequent dif-
ferences in measurement of top income shares, as well as the host of other
differences that exist across countries.
28 We estimate income cyclicality for
the top 1 percent in the period from 1982 onward (the period for which we
found higher top 1 percent income cyclicality for the United States) and
for the period 1970–82 (as a benchmark period). Of the 22 countries, we
exclude 6 (Australia, Finland, Germany, New Zealand, Norway, and the
United Kingdom) for which income measures include capital gains and
1 (Switzerland) for which incomes are not available at an annual fre-
quency.
29 Furthermore, we require countries to have at least five obser-
vations of growth rates in the 1970–82 period and five in the 1982–2007
period, leading us to drop another 5 countries (Argentina, China, Indonesia,
Netherlands, and Spain). This leaves 10 countries (Canada, France, India,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, and the United States).
The original data for Canada extend only to 2000, but we obtained data
up to 2007 from Michael Veall.
30 As shown in figure 5, there is a positive
relationship between the increase in top 1 percent beta and the increase
in top 1 percent income shares. The fitted value is from an ordinary least
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28. An example is whether the unit of analysis is the family or the individual. See
Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez (forthcoming), table 3 and related text.
29. We include Finland in the set for which incomes include capital gains. Although it is
possible to calculate top 1 percent income shares from the original article (Jantti and others
2010), it appears infeasible to calculate aggregate totals that fully exclude capital gains.
30. The updated data from Veall start in 1982. We use the original data for earlier years
and the updated data from 1982 on, with growth rates always calculated using income data
from the same dataset. In the dataset from Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez (2010), U.S. aggregate
income is based on tax records. This may bias upward the beta of the top 1 percent in the
period that includes the 1986 tax reform (if incomes are distorted by tax reform effects more
for the top 1 percent than for other groups). We therefore drop the growth rates for 1987 and
1988 for the United States but could alternatively use NIPA aggregate income as in our ear-
lier analysis (the 1986 growth rate is not an outlier in this dataset).
12367-01a_Parker_rev2.qxd  2/17/11  10:07 AM  Page 4546 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2010
Change in betab









Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez (2010).
a. Line represents fitted value.







Figure 5. Changes in Betas and Changes in Income Shares of the Top 1 Percent in 
10 Countries, 1970–2007
a
squares regression relating the change in top 1 percent beta to the change
in average top 1 percent income shares. The slope coefﬁcient in this regres-
sion is 0.42 (the heteroscedasticity-robust standard error is 0.07) and the
R
2 is 0.64.
Overall, these three different approaches all suggest that in recent
decades, the greater is the top 1 percent income share, the higher is income
cyclicality for those in the top 1 percent.
V. Technological Change and Changes in High-Income 
Shares and Cyclicality
This section argues using a simple example that increases in the scale at
which top earners operate naturally lead to increases in both income and
income cyclicality at the top of the distribution. We do not provide addi-
tional tests to support this interpretation of the facts. Instead we intend in
this section to put forward an additional theory, to be considered in future
work, about the underlying economic drivers behind these two phenomena.
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The leading explanation for the broad increase in wage and income
inequality that started in the 1970s is that technological change over this
period has complemented the skills of highly skilled workers (see, for
example, Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2008, Acemoglu and Autor 2010).
There is also evidence that changes in economic institutions or regulation
(such as minimum wages and unionization) have increased income inequal-
ity at the lower end of the distribution. At the very top of the distribution,
Piketty and Saez (2003) argue that the speed and size of the increases in
relative earnings are inconsistent with the main existing theories based on
skill-biased technological change, and that the evidence from top income
shares may instead suggest an important role for changing social norms with
respect to high earnings. Finally, there is a well-developed literature on the
rise in relative compensation for a subset of top earners, namely, corporate
chief executive ofﬁcers (CEOs). Several explanations have been proposed
for the rise in relative CEO pay, including a shift in social norms regarding
compensation, an increase in managerial power (rent extraction, captured
boards), a shift in demand from speciﬁc to general skills, an increase in the
size of firms, and skill-biased technological change (Kaplan and Rauh
2010, Bertrand 2009).
Top executives are, however, a minority of highly compensated indi-
viduals. Steven Kaplan and Joshua Rauh (2010) document that only about
5 percent of earners in the top 0.01 percent are executives of nonfinan-
cial firms. They also show that investment bankers, other financial asset
managers (at hedge, venture capital, private equity, and mutual funds),
lawyers, and to a smaller extent athletes and celebrities all make up signif-
icant fractions of the top income groups.
31 Kaplan and Rauh argue that the
fact that pay has increased dramatically at the top in each of these sectors
is evidence against the ﬁrst three explanations above. Neither social norms
nor increased managerial power seems relevant for the pay of many occupa-
tions among top earners, such as hedge fund managers, and speciﬁc rather
than general skills seem more important for lawyers, hedge fund managers,
investment bankers, and professional athletes. Expanding on the argument
of Xavier Gabaix and Augustin Landier (2008) that increased CEO pay
can be explained by increased ﬁrm size, Kaplan and Rauh further show
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31. Bakija and others (2010) provide much more detailed occupational information,
indicating that another large subgroup within the highest income groups is people in medical
occupations.
12367-01a_Parker_rev2.qxd  2/17/11  10:07 AM  Page 47that the leading ﬁnancial services ﬁrms, law ﬁrms, and hedge, venture cap-
ital, and private equity funds have grown larger over time (measured by
inputs or output). This does not fully explain the increase in CEO pay (and
the top 1 percent income share), however, since average ﬁrm size was
increasing before 1980, too. What is needed to explain these facts is that
the impact of ﬁrm size on top 1 percent pay is higher than it was before, as
might arise from skill-biased technological change favoring those at the
top. This would amount to a mix of the last two theories listed above.
Of these existing theories, which also predict an increase in the income
cyclicality of top earners? The canonical theories of skill-biased techno-
logical change require a separate assumption that the technology that com-
plements skill has a very cyclical impact on those at the top of the income
distribution.
32 Other theories of rising pay at the top similarly require addi-
tional assumptions—that the ability of CEOs to “steal” is cyclical or that
norms about pay are highly cyclical (for example, because high pay or con-
spicuous consumption is more stigmatized during recessions).
Although changing institutions and regulations, power structures, or
norms may have a role in the changes we have observed, we argue that
these changes are not inconsistent with a theory of skill-biased techno-
logical change—speciﬁcally, changes in ICT—in which these changes have
increased the scale at which the top earners operate. We show theoreti-
cally that if advances in ICT have increased the ability to scale the appli-
cation of high skills, this naturally implies both that top incomes will rise
and that fluctuations in demand over the business cycle will affect the
incomes of the highest-skill individuals disproportionately. The next sub-
section describes this mechanism, leaving empirical tests or calibrations
for future work.
V.B. A Theory of Why Very High Income Individuals Have Higher and
More Cyclical Incomes than in the Past
The rise of ICT has allowed the most skilled in any given occupation
to apply their talents more broadly, for example, to manage more workers
and capital, to entertain more people, or to write more papers. Thus, ICT
has lowered the extent to which quality declines when more output is pro-
duced; in other words, it has made marginal revenue curves decline more
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32. One approach would be to assume that the latest technologies that complement
the skills of the most highly paid are tied to new investment (in physical capital of higher
quality, in equipment and software, or in organizational capital). Then, since investment is
highly procyclical, skill-biased technological change could lead to both higher incomes and
higher cyclicality of incomes for those with the highest skills.
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earnings of the most skilled. The highest earners tend to have larger ﬂuctu-
ations in their earnings than the rest of the population because those who
operate at a large scale naturally have lower proﬁt margins and so are more
exposed to cyclical ﬂuctuations.
The following simple model formalizes this argument and illustrates
how those with higher incomes tend also to have more cyclical incomes.
33
Let each worker produce earnings according to
where 0 < α < 1 and αA > c. Further assume that workers earn the full net
revenue they contribute to the ﬁrm, so that earnings are π=Ai
α − ci. Very
highly skilled workers have higher α than they had in the past, whereas
changes in α for lower-skilled workers are zero or comparatively small. A
higher α means that a worker’s marginal product diminishes less rapidly as
the input i increases. The assumption αA > c ensures that high-α workers
earn more than low-α workers. The key change in our earnings function
that generates both increased cyclicality and increased earnings shares for
highly skilled workers is our conjecture that growth in ICT has increased α
for very highly skilled workers during the period since 1982.
Three different interpretations of our revenue or earnings function are
useful. First, the most obvious interpretation is that all workers produce
output of identical quality, but the best produce more for given inputs and
have less diminishing returns to scale. In our equations this corresponds
to i being inputs, y = i
α, p = A, and c being the price of the inputs. In this
interpretation the ICT revolution increases the returns to scale (that is,
reduces the degree of decreasing returns to scale) of the best workers and
allows them to work with more inputs; for example, a CEO can manage a
larger company.
A second interpretation of equation 4 is that ICT has changed markets
so that highly skilled workers are more like superstars in the sense of
Sherwin Rosen (1981). That is, highly skilled workers produce the same
number of units of output for given inputs as other workers, but as they pro-
duce more output, the quality of that output declines more slowly than that
of other workers does. As in Rosen (1981, p. 849), “superior talent stands
out and does not deteriorate so rapidly with market size as inferior talent
does.” In this interpretation the ICT revolution has lowered how quickly
() , 4 py ci Ai ci −= −
α
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33. Our earnings function is in the spirit of the equilibrium model of Lucas (1978).
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corresponds to i being both input and output (y = i), the price p being a
function of quality that decreases with output as p(y) = Ay
α−1 (so py = Ai
α),
and c being the marginal cost of producing another unit of output. For
example, the top lawyers (in the post-1982 world) may be able to write
more briefs without the quality of their legal advice suffering as much
as would be the case for less skilled lawyers (for example, because of the
impact of ICT on the ease with which case histories can be researched).
A ﬁnal and closely related interpretation is that of an asset manager paid
based on performance. In this interpretation let i be assets under manage-
ment, c the expected return investors can earn elsewhere, and Ai
α the (risk-
adjusted) trading proﬁts of the fund.
34 The earnings equation then captures
the idea that the best fund managers are increasingly able to invest more
money without the returns on their investments deteriorating as much as
for other fund managers.
Given our assumptions, the optimal level of i is
with associated earnings for the worker of
Equation 6 delivers our two main results.
First, because workers with higher α earn higher incomes (by assump-
tion), income inequality and top income shares increase when the α of top
earners increases. In equation 6, dπ/dα > 0. This occurs because highly
skilled workers generate more revenue for given inputs, and they are opti-
mally matched with more inputs because they have less decreasing returns
to scale.
Second, an increase in the α of high-α workers increases the cyclical-
ity of their earnings. Assume that business cycle ﬂuctuations are driven by
ﬂuctuation in A, representing either market demand shocks or technology
shocks. The percentage change in proﬁts depends on α as





= ( ) − ( )
− ( )
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34. This structure corresponds to a setting with no management fees and a 100 percent
carry, but the results should generalize to a more standard contract with a 2 percent fee and
20 percent carry.
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of a worker increases if the worker’s α rises. Note that d lnπ/d lnA does not
depend on whether i is adjusted optimally in response to the change in A,
since by the envelope theorem, dπ/di = 0 at the initial value of A. Thus, the
high cyclicality of earnings is driven not by a higher cyclicality of inputs,
but by the increased sensitivity of earnings to demand that comes from
working with a higher level of inputs. That said, the input scale of more
highly skilled workers is more cyclical in this model; it is just not the cause
of greater income cyclicality.
The intuition for the different cyclicalities is that more highly skilled
workers optimally are working with more inputs (interpretation 1) or pro-
ducing more output (interpretations 2 and 3). Their revenue is similarly sen-
sitive to ﬂuctuations as those of lower-skill individuals, since ﬂuctuations
in A affect the revenue of each worker proportionately. However, for
highly skilled workers, costs are higher relative to revenue, so ci is more
substantial relative to Ai
α for these workers. This makes their earnings,
π=Ai
α − ci, more cyclical. For low-skilled workers, inputs are small rela-
tive to revenue, so ﬂuctuations in earnings are in percentage terms more
similar to ﬂuctuations in revenue.
VI. Conclusion
Coinciding with the increase in the income share of top earners since the
early 1980s has been an increase in the cyclicality of the incomes of top
earners. The high cyclicality that we document for top incomes, including
wages and salaries, appears to be linked empirically to increases in the
income shares of top earners, based on variation over time, across groups
of top earners, and across countries. This increased cyclicality and its link
to increased income shares should contribute to a better understanding of
the reasons behind the increase in top income shares.
We propose that the information and communications revolution pro-
vides a natural way to think about how technological change may have
raised both top income shares and top income cyclicality. The change in
technology that we suggest—increased scale or increased “superstar”-type
production by top earners—generates a simple connection between income
shares and cyclicality, in that the earnings of those operating on a larger
scale naturally become more sensitive to the business cycle. Our brief
analysis of our posited mechanism leaves open the question of how well
it can quantitatively match the documented changes in cyclicality over
time and across countries.
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Comments and Discussion
COMMENT BY
REBECCA M. BLANK1 This paper by Jonathan Parker and Annette
Vissing-Jorgensen is highly interesting. Its primary conclusion, that incomes
have become markedly more cyclical at the very top of the income distri-
bution in the past 25 years, is surprising and intriguing. The paper presents a
new fact about the world that was not previously known, and this makes it
likely that the paper will stimulate further research and debate.
For an empirical economist, there is much to like in this paper. The
authors do an extremely thorough job of data analysis. They use multiple
datasets to confirm and test their results, with substantial attention to
proving the robustness of what they find. Any careful reader will come
away impressed by the serious data work in the paper and persuaded that
the cyclicality of incomes among the top 1 percent of U.S. households
has indeed increased. That said, as with most papers that uncover new
facts, there is more work to be done to understand and interpret this result,
so that it informs the theoretical framework that economists use when
thinking about income generation, inequality, and macroeconomic change.
It is important to be clear about what the results in this paper do not
show. The greater cyclicality that the authors discuss appears to be focused
at the very top of the income distribution, particularly among the top 1 per-
cent of households. Hence, this result does not overturn the frequently
noted result that incomes are more cyclical among lower-income families
than among higher-income families. On average, income in the bottom
quintiles is more cyclical than in the middle quintile, as the authors’ table 8
demonstrates. Furthermore, the authors reiterate the fact that the cyclical
1. These comments reflect the personal opinion of the author and do not necessarily
represent the views of the Department of Commerce or the U.S. Government.
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among lower-income families.
On the question of who is most hurt by cyclical downturns, nothing
in this paper refutes the widely held belief, buttressed by substantial evi-
dence, that lower-income families (particularly those headed by someone
with less education, working in a lower-wage job) experience greater
economic deprivation in a recession than do other families. These families
experience a disproportionate share of unemployment and are more likely
than other families to need government assistance to survive economically
during bad economic times. The fact that income and consumption pat-
terns (as the authors show) are also highly cyclical at the very top of the
income distribution is less likely to signal deprivation, although it may
well create real stress within these families. Households in the top 1 per-
cent of the income distribution have substantial savings and assets and
can smooth their consumption if they wish. This means that the con-
sumption cyclicality that they experience (matching their income cycli-
cality) is best viewed as an economic choice on their part. In contrast,
consumption cyclicality among very poor families who have no savings
is much more likely to be an involuntary and unavoidable response to
changes in earnings and income.
It would therefore be inaccurate to interpret the results in this paper as
saying something about well-being. Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen are clear
on this point, but it is worth stressing nonetheless. The results in this paper
do, however, inevitably raise the question of why this cyclicality has
increased among households at the very top of the income distribution,
particularly given the close relationship between rising cyclicality and
increases in absolute levels of inequality, which the authors document. At
the end of the paper, Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen present a theory that
focuses on changes in information and communications technologies (ICT)
that have increased the ability of highly skilled persons to leverage their
skills and expand their income, leading to rising inequality. The authors’
model suggests that this exposes them to greater cyclical ﬂuctuations.
I find this model a plausible story, although it is just that at the
moment—a possible story, without supporting evidence. To investigate
whether the data support this theory, one would want to look at changes
in earnings levels and cyclicality among high-earning workers who might
have greater “leverage” due to the ICT revolution, and among those who
might be less affected by this phenomenon. Unfortunately, when one is
exploring a phenomenon that is primarily visible in only the top 1 percent
of the population, such investigations are hard to pursue.
COMMENTS and DISCUSSION 57
12367-01b_Parker-Comments-rev.qxd  2/17/11  10:07 AM  Page 57What is happening in ICT may be only part of the change in the eco-
nomic environment facing top-earning workers. The expanded global mar-
kets in which more and more companies are operating also provide scope
to utilize the gains from ICT that did not exist before. It might have been
useful for the authors to say more about globalization and how it relates to
their theory.
My biggest hesitation about the causal hypothesis that Parker and
Vissing-Jorgensen present is that it is unclear to me why it would be limited
to workers at the extreme top of the income distribution. Both the greater
global marketplaces and the expanded possibilities created by new ICT
should have benefited many higher-skilled workers. The authors’ results
suggest that the increased income cyclicality they observe is closely related
to cyclicality in wages and salaries among the topmost earners and does not
reflect rising cyclicality in hours of work or in other forms of income.
At a minimum, this suggests that compensation among the very top earners
is more tied to overall economic performance than it is among workers even
slightly lower in the earnings distribution. Perhaps additional theoretical
structure is needed to explain why compensation practices at the very top
differ from those even a little lower on the wage spectrum.
For instance, one question I would be very interested in knowing more
about is how compensation packages for top earners differ across indus-
tries and occupations. Although Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen indicate
that the top 1 percent of earners are spread across industries (table 5 in their
paper), my guess is that there may be different compensation practices for
(say) those who manage money for large manufacturing firms than for
those who manage the firm’s operations. And the ability of new ICT to
enlarge the possible value generated by these different top managers might
also vary. It may take a series of more micro-focused case studies, looking
at very highly paid senior people in a selected group of industries and
occupations, to better understand and investigate both the authors’ theory
and their empirical results.
Let me close with a comment about the data. As the authors note, it is
extremely difﬁcult to study the phenomenon of income cyclicality at the top
because very few of the available datasets are large enough to produce a
reasonable-sized sample among the top 1 percent of earners. And very few
available datasets are accurate enough to produce informative data about that
group, even if their samples were larger. Among survey statisticians there is
widespread concern about lower survey response rates among the extremely
wealthy. (Of course, sample weighting techniques can adjust for this, but a
small number of observations with larger weights will lead to less accuracy.)
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households whose actual income would not place them in this category. For
all of these reasons, annual cross-sectional datasets based on relatively small
samples of the population (such as the Current Population Survey or the
Consumer Expenditure Survey) are probably of limited value in addressing
the questions raised by this paper. For this reason, I would place less reliance
on tables 5 and 6, which use those data, than on other results in the paper.
Even if one combines a number of years’ data together to produce a larger
sample, data reliability questions may still pose problems for the researcher.
This means that there are probably two datasets best suited to look at
this small sliver of the population: the Statistics of Income data, which
the authors use intensively, and the American Community Survey (ACS).
The ACS, which the authors do not use, replaced the old “long form” of the
decennial census after the 2000 census. It collects information monthly on a
wide variety of indicators (including income, earnings, and family compo-
sition) from a random sample of families. In any one year, the ACS samples
a little over 1.9 million households. Although the ACS lacks data from
before the 2000s, and so cannot be used to investigate long-term trends in
cyclicality, it can be used to look in much greater depth at who the families
and individuals are at the very top of the income distribution in recent years,
and at how different types of households and families responded to the
Great Recession. Those who want to explore these issues further should
think about the possibilities provided by the ACS for this research question.
Overall, this is a ﬁne paper. In some ways it merely adds to the puzzle of
why and how inequality and earnings among very top earners have changed
over the past 25 years. But by adding a new fact about income cyclicality,
and closely linking that fact with rising incomes among these earners, the
paper provides information that will help economists winnow out the vari-
ous theories that have been proposed to explain widening inequality. The
most believable explanations will be those that explain both the rising lev-
els of income and the rising income cyclicality in this group.
COMMENT BY
ERIK HURST This paper by Jonathan Parker and Annette Vissing-
Jorgensen documents an interesting, important, and novel set of facts
pertaining to the cyclicality of income for very high income individuals.
The paper shows that in recent years, households in the top 1 percent of the
income distribution have much more cyclical incomes than most other
households. Additionally, the paper shows that this high relative cyclicality
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decade) with the well-documented increase in income inequality driven by
the increasing income share for these households, and that it is robust to
controlling for stock options, household ﬁxed effects, and taxes and trans-
fers. The facts are very carefully documented, and I have no comments
whatsoever on the existing empirical work in the paper.
The second part of the paper lays out a simple theory to explain these
facts. In particular, it asks what factors could possibly result both in an
increasing share of income earned by very high income individuals and
in an increasing cyclicality of income for those individuals. The authors pro-
pose a model where information and communications technologies have
increased the optimal production scale for the most talented individuals.
Nothing in the paper convincingly supports or convincingly refutes this
theory. Rather, as the authors note, it is simply one theory that could simul-
taneously generate increasing income inequality and increasing cyclicality
among those with very high incomes.
My comments are structured in two parts. First, I want to emphasize
that the authors make no claims about the welfare costs of recessions. They
are very clear about this. However, it is a point worth reemphasizing so
that the paper’s implications are not misconstrued. Second, I will offer
some new facts related to the changing nature of compensation that took
place for higher-income households during this period. In particular,
bonus income increased in importance for high-income households dur-
ing the 1990s and early 2000s. As I show below, bonus income is much
more cyclical than other types of income and is more closely associated
with the ﬁnance industry than with other industries.
WHAT THIS PAPER IS NOT ABOUT. Upon reading this paper, one is
tempted to use the facts that it documents to make statements pertaining to
the distributional costs of business cycle ﬂuctuations. The authors caution
readers against making such types of calculations. I want to underscore
this point.
The authors show (convincingly) that the cyclicality of income is much
higher for those with very high incomes than for other income groups and
that this cyclicality has been increasing over time. Do these results imply
that the cost of business cycles, in terms of standard utility-based measures
of welfare, is higher for those with very high incomes than for those at
other points of the income distribution? Do the results imply that over the
last two and a half decades, those with very high incomes are bearing an
increasing brunt of business cycle variation in terms of changes in welfare?
The answer to both of these questions is a resounding no. Variations in
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variations in standard, utility-based measures of welfare. Households with
sufﬁcient wealth can self-insure against income ﬂuctuations by accumulat-
ing and then drawing down assets. Households can maintain consumption
ﬂows despite variation in consumption outlays by delaying the replacement
of durables, and even some goods traditionally defined as nondurable,
such as clothing or vacation spending, have aspects of durability. Finally,
given standard assumptions about household preferences, concave util-
ity functions imply that a given change in expenditure will have a much
smaller effect on utility for individuals with very high expenditure than
for individuals with lower expenditure.
Two other facts need to be emphasized. First, households with very
high incomes may have anticipated the increase in risk to their incomes
that the authors document, and if so, one would expect them to have
demanded compensation for bearing that risk. This could explain the fact
that those with very high incomes are earning higher returns on their labor
and simultaneously facing more variable labor income streams. The story
is analogous to the difference between investing in stocks and investing in
bonds. If the earnings of those with very high incomes have become more
stock-like (taking more of an equity stake in their employing ﬁrm through
their labor investments), it is not surprising to see them bearing more risk
and receiving higher returns. Second, and a related point, the variation in
income for these households could be either transitory or permanent. In
order to compute standard welfare calculations using income and expen-
diture data (even if one could measure the service ﬂow of expenditure
correctly), one needs to know whether the observed variation in income
was perceived as a transitory shock or as a permanent shock. To the extent
that business cycle variation implies differences in expectations about the
evolution of the permanent component of income for individuals at differ-
ent points of the income distribution, welfare calculations again become
complicated.
Collectively, the results in this paper do not suggest that the brunt of
business cycles in terms of changing well-being is being disproportion-
ately borne by those with very high incomes in recent periods. What the
paper does show is that the income of those at the top of the income dis-
tribution has become more cyclical. I view these results as potentially
informative about the changing nature of compensation in the economy
over the last few decades, not as an input into how we think about the
distributional costs of cyclical variation. Like the authors, I would caution
readers against using the paper’s results to draw conclusions about how
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the income distribution.
THE INCREASING IMPORTANCE OF BONUS INCOME AT THE TOP. The
paper left me with a few lingering questions about which components of
earnings are driving the results. First, how important are bonuses for indi-
viduals at the top of the income distribution? Second, are bonuses more
important for individuals in some professions than in others? Third, has the
composition of bonus-receiving professions been changing over time?
Fourth, is bonus income more cyclical than other types of income? Finally,
can bonuses help explain the correlation between the increased share of
income and the increased cyclicality of income for very high income
households?
Some of these questions are hard to answer with existing datasets. I will
try to provide some information on some of these questions using data from
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), and will then discuss further
why bonus income could help explain the facts documented in the paper. I
wish to emphasize that these PSID results are meant to be only suggestive.
The PSID is not an ideal dataset for analyzing the earnings behavior of very
high income households, because of its limited sample size.
The PSID disaggregates labor earnings into the following categories:
regular wage and salary income, bonus income, income from commis-
sions, tips, overtime compensation, and business income. For my analysis
I use data from the 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007 waves
of the PSID, and I pool bonus and commission income together, because
commissions, like bonuses, could be related to work effort and could vary
with the state of the aggregate economy. I restrict the sample to male heads
of households between the ages of 16 and 70 who were currently employed
and had positive earnings during the preceding year. The earnings reports I
use are total earnings (from all sources) within a particular category from
the preceding year. For example, bonus earnings reported in the 1995 wave
of the PSID refer to all bonuses earned during calendar 1994. All earnings
data are converted into 2000 dollars, when applicable.
To compute earnings percentiles, I rank all earnings for individuals
within the sample separately for each year. Given the sample sizes, I clas-
sify households into the top 2.5 percentiles (the richest households), per-
centiles 2.5–5.0, percentiles 5.0–10.0, and the bottom 90 percentiles. I look
at three measures: the share of households receiving either bonus or com-
mission earnings, the share of total earnings that come from either bonus
or commission earnings, and the fraction of household heads who work in
the ﬁnance industry. As it turns out, the inclusion of commissions adds lit-
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than commissions, and therefore in what follows I refer to the sum of
bonus and commission income simply as bonus income.
My table 1 shows, ﬁrst, the fraction of household heads in each of the
above percentile ranges who received bonus income. These results pool
the data across all years. Only 9 percent of household heads in the bot-
tom 90 percentiles of the income distribution received bonus income. For
the other income groups, the fraction receiving bonus income rises with
income, reaching 29 percent in the highest income group. The table also
shows the average fraction of income that comes from bonuses across all
households within the different percentile ranges. This is calculated as the
simple average of the bonus share across all individuals within each range.
This share likewise increases as one moves up the earnings ladder. For
example, the average individual in the top 2.5 percentiles gets about 8 per-
cent of earnings from bonuses, compared with 1 percent for the average
individual in the bottom 90 percentiles. Finally, the third line of table 1
shows the average bonus share for those households who reported positive
bonus income. The conclusion from table 1 is that bonus income is more
important for higher-earning than for lower-earning households.
Figure 1 shows the time-series patterns in the bonus share of earnings
for household heads in the bottom 90 percentiles and for those in the top
2.5 percentiles. The figure shows a dramatic increase in the share of
income earned from bonuses between 1994 (from the 1995 survey) and
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Table 1. Importance of Bonus Income across the Income Distribution, Pooled Yearsa
Percent
Labor earnings percentiles
Indicator Bottom 90 5–10 2.5–5 Top 2.5
Fraction receiving bonus income,
all heads of household 9 19 22 29
Share of bonus income in total 
income, all heads of household 1 3 4 8
Share of bonus income in total 
income, bonus recipients only 11 17 20 28
Sample size 25,028 1,117 542 533
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007
waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics.
a. Sample includes all currently employed male heads of household between ages 16 and 70 who had
positive income in the preceding year. Percentiles are deﬁned within each year separately. All differ-
ences are statistically signiﬁcant from each other except for the 5–10 percentile and 2.5–5 percentile
comparisons.
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in 1994 roughly 5 percent of this group’s earnings came from bonuses, in
2004 that figure was roughly 10 percent. In contrast, those in the bottom
90 percentiles show no discernable trend in the share of income earned
from bonuses.
To summarize, the PSID results show that the share of income from
bonuses among households at the top of the income distribution was
increasing at the same time that these households, according to the data
that the paper uses, were seeing both an increased share of total income
and an increased cyclicality of income. This suggests that the rise in bonus
income among these households may relate to the patterns documented by
Parker and Vissing-Jorgensen.
Is there a statistical relationship between the receipt of bonus income
and working in the ﬁnance sector? Steven Kaplan and Joshua Rauh (2010)
show that individuals in the ﬁnance sector increased their share in the very
top of the income distribution during the 1990s and the early 2000s. The
same patterns hold in the PSID data. In 1994, 12 percent of individuals in
the top 2.5 percent of the income distribution were in the ﬁnance industry;
by 2004 this ﬁgure had risen to nearly 18.5 percent.






1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Source: Author’s calculations using data from the 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007
waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. 
a. Plot of the coefficients on the year dummies in the regression reported in the second results column
in table 2. Sample includes all currently employed male heads of household between ages 16 and 70 who




Top 2.5 percentiles adjusted for financea
Figure 1. Share of Income from Bonuses, 1995–2007
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Table 2. Regressions Explaining Bonus Income with Finance Industry Employment
and Income, Pooled Yearsa
Dependent variable
Bonus share of total income
Dummy for All heads of Bonus
Independent variable positive bonush o useholds recipients only
Dummy for employment in 0.075 0.041 0.159
ﬁnance industry (0.026) (0.012) (0.052)
Dummy for income in  0.103 0.024 0.057
top 10 percentiles (0.021) (0.007) (0.030)
Dummy for income in  0.087 0.043 0.084
top 2.5 percentiles (0.026) (0.017) (0.047)
Constant 0.091 0.009 0.104
(0.004) (0.001) (0.009)
Sample size 27,220 27,220 2,902
Source: Authors’ regressions using data from the 1995, 1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007 waves
of the PSID.
a. Sample includes all currently employed male heads of household between ages 16 and 70 who had
positive income in the preceding year. Percentiles are deﬁned within each year separately. Robust stan-
dard errors are in parentheses.
Table 2 shows the results of three regressions. Each regresses some
measure of the importance of bonus income on a dummy variable indicating
whether the individual is in the ﬁnance industry, a dummy for whether the
individual is in the top 10 percent of the income distribution, and a dummy
for whether the individual is in the top 2.5 percent of the income distrib-
ution. (If the individual is in the top 2.5 percent, both the top 10 percent
dummy and the top 2.5 percent dummy have a value of 1.) I run these
regressions on the entire pooled sample. As the table shows, being in the
ﬁnance industry increases the likelihood of receiving a bonus, the share of
income that comes from bonuses, and the share of income coming from
bonuses conditional on receiving a bonus.
Given that the finance industry has been increasing in importance
over time, a natural question is how much of the increasing share of bonus
income for those individuals with very high income during the 1990s and
early 2000s (documented above) was simply due to the increasing promi-
nence of individuals in the ﬁnance industry in that group. To address this,
I run two regressions on a sample that includes only those individuals in the
top 2.5 percentiles of the income distribution. The ﬁrst simply regresses
the share of income from bonuses on year dummies. The second regresses
the same dependent variable on year dummies, a dummy for whether the
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dummy with the year dummies. Figure 1 also plots the coefﬁcients on the
year dummies from these regressions and shows that a substantial part of
the increase in the bonus share of earnings for this group, particularly after
1998, was due to the increasing importance of the ﬁnance industry.
The PSID data do not go back far enough in time to allow a full analysis
of the cyclicality of bonus income. However, it is not a leap to think that
bonus income is more cyclical than other types of income, given that it is
usually linked to firm performance or profits. If that is the case, then as
bonus income has been a more important component of income for those
with very high incomes, this could be a cause of the increased cyclicality of
income for these individuals.
What can the increasing importance of bonus income reveal about the
relationship between the rising share of total income accruing to very
high income individuals and the increased cyclicality of income for these
individuals? One possibility is that the facts documented in the paper
are simply driven by the increasing share of very high income individu-
als working in the finance industry. On average, individuals employed in
finance receive a larger share of their income as bonuses, and they are
more likely to be represented among the very rich. Although this is likely
to be some of the story, it is not the entire story. As shown in the paper,
some evidence suggests that it is unlikely that the compositional switch
within the group of very high income individuals toward finance solely
explains their results.
The rise in importance of bonus income does reveal that the nature of
compensation has been changing. Ex ante, higher-income individuals are
relying more on bonus income as a form of compensation. Bonus income
is more risky than some other forms of compensation in that it is directly
tied to ﬁrm proﬁts. To be willing to bear this risk, these high-income indi-
viduals need to be compensated for it. As a result, the shift toward bonus
income can be consistent with the rising share of income for these house-
holds as well as with the increased cyclicality. But why has the compen-
sation structure changed such that those who had very high incomes to
begin with are willing to bear this additional income risk? Are such risk-
sharing agreements efﬁcient, in that they better align incentives between
the high-income workers and the firm? Are the high-income workers
becoming synonymous with the ﬁrm itself? If these workers are now will-
ing to take on more risk of the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability, does that imply that the
other workers are now facing less risk? Does it imply that other investors
in the ﬁrm are facing less risk? The facts in this paper should be leading
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risk within the economy.
SUMMARY. Overall, this is a very nice paper. The methodology is well
executed, and the results are well documented. The question remaining
is what is driving those results. The paper proposes one story. But there is
nothing in the paper that confirms (or contradicts) this story. It appears
that the changing nature of compensation of very high income individu-
als in the form of the rising importance of bonus income is potentially part
of the story. The facts documented in the paper, collectively, should point
researchers toward addressing a whole series of interesting questions.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION George Perry observed that developments in
the ﬁnancial sector can largely explain the sharp rise in economy-wide
inequality between 1982 and 2008 that the authors analyze. In the authors’
data, wages and salaries of the top 0.1 percent of the income distribution
were $183 billion higher in 2008 than if they had just kept up with the
average rise since 1982. Wages and salaries per worker in finance rose
nearly twice as much as the economy-wide average over this period, and
total wages and salaries in ﬁnance in 2008 were $154 billion higher than if
the per worker average had simply kept up with the rest of the economy.
Hedge funds, which were in their infancy at the start of the 1980s, man-
aged an estimated $2.5 trillion in 2008, which would account for roughly
$100 billion of financial wages and salaries that year. Hedge funds are
also characterized by high earnings volatility, as are other leveraged
financial activities that generate very high incomes and greatly expanded
over this period. All this suggests that ﬁnance is not just part of the income
distribution story but the dominant part. Economies of scale have always
existed in ﬁnance. What has changed in the ﬁnancial sector is the increasing
application of leverage and risk.
Refet Gürkaynak found one of the most fascinating findings in this
paper to be that not just income, but also consumption, has become more
volatile at the top of the income distribution. That finding is surprising,
because one would think that individuals at the very top also have suffi-
cient wealth to smooth their consumption. He further suggested that the
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relationship in ﬁnance. If a greater proportion of an individual’s compen-
sation is in the form of bonuses, which are more volatile than wages and
salary, that individual would have to be compensated more on average to
be willing to accept that risk.
Benjamin Friedman was likewise fascinated by the finding of higher
consumption volatility at the high end. He proposed three potential expla-
nations. First, available statistics other than those from tax records (which
do not report consumption directly) are unreliable at the extremes, and so
the ﬁnding might simply be spurious. Second, even though people at the
top of the income distribution also have higher wealth-to-income ratios,
much of that wealth is in illiquid form and so might not be available to
smooth consumption. Third, consumption by people at the very top may be
lumpier. Whatever the explanation, it was a puzzling ﬁnding that seemed
to go against accepted knowledge. Erik Hurst added that even if consump-
tion is volatile for the really wealthy, their utility is probably not much
affected. Happiness data show that happiness is not more volatile for the
very rich than for other households.
William Nordhaus thought that what might be going on at the very top
end is that some people are able to impose a “tax” on the proﬁts of compa-
nies that they control, in the form of bonuses, stock options, or perks.
Because proﬁts are cyclical, this income will also be cyclical. To the extent
that compensation structures are becoming more incentive-based, moving
away from a ﬁxed base pay, this should contribute to making top incomes
more cyclical. Nordhaus was also concerned that capital gains are a very
large omitted part of income. To the extent that some cyclicality of the
capital gains component is not getting measured, that would be another
explanation for the paper’s ﬁnding.
James Hines noted that the Tax Reform Act of 1986 changed not only
tax rates but also the definition of taxable income. Some of the difference
in the proportion of income going to the very top depends on this defini-
tional change. Also, because tax rates on the very rich are much lower
today than in earlier decades, the rich have less incentive to avoid classi-
fying some income as taxable income. The estate tax, which has seen an
extreme reduction recently, also bears on the decisionmaking of top
income groups. Assets can now be given to a trust in the name of a child
and will not show up as income.
Gary Burtless argued that another important change was in the incentive
to hold income within corporations as opposed to organizing the ﬁrm so
that the income is immediately treated as though distributed to all of the
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for corporate income to be held within companies rather than distributed to
rich shareholders; after the reform, this incentive changed. Many compa-
nies were reorganized so that company income was taxed only once, as
personal income to shareholders. Income at the top might be more cyclical
today in part because some income was formerly sheltered within the cor-
poration. Under current law, all the cyclicality in that corporate income
will be reﬂected directly in the owner’s personal income tax.
Robert Gordon noted that the share of total executive income taking the
form of stock options rose dramatically during the 1990s. Also, the two big
recent episodes of stock market volatility were synchronous with the busi-
ness cycle, making it difﬁcult to distinguish between its role and that of the
stock market cycle. Gordon suggested that quite a bit of the increase in top
income cyclicality might be due to the increased dependence of very top
income earners on stock options. He proposed as a possible explanation a
general increase in the market power of managers, which could help to
explain both the increase in inequality and the increased downward
responsiveness of labor hours to the decline in output, as has occurred in
the last two recessions. The question was how much of this shift in mar-
ket power is due to growing strength at the top versus growing weakness
at the bottom. It could be that the eroding market power of workers at the
bottom created a vacuum, and the top moved in.
Karen Dynan was interested in how the authors’ ﬁndings related to the
so-called Great Moderation. If top income groups accounted for a greater
share of total income in this period, and at the same time were experienc-
ing greater income volatility, how does that square with the stylized fact of
greater moderation in the macroeconomy, and how might that inform the
understanding of that period?
Justin Wolfers found the paper’s analysis to be extremely thorough
across datasets, and the results as reliable as they could be given certain
weaknesses in the data. He also noted that the main finding is not only
well supported, but surprising. Two years ago, if someone had surveyed
100 labor economists and asked them whether rich people were more
likely than others to get hurt by recessions, the majority, he believed,
would have said no. Wolfers also suggested further testing the theory
using data from the so-called Great Compression of the 1920s through
the 1950s—a period that also saw a large shift in income inequality but
in the opposite direction.
Robert Hall observed that the rational thing to do when one’s life-
time resources change immediately and dramatically is to change one’s
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that high-income households would act any differently in such circum-
stances. Following up on Gürkaynak’s point about the risk-return rela-
tionship, Hall noted that there is also a lot of evidence that ordinary
wages contain an insurance element, especially among longer-term
workers, who are typically insulated from layoffs. Somebody has to
stand on the other side of this insurance deal. To the extent that that
somebody is the high-income shareholders of the same firms, this could
explain the observed volatility of their incomes.
Bruce Meyer reported that a student of Anthony Atkinson had found
that high-income shares of total income rise dramatically after financial
crises. This result comes from 50 years of data from many countries. He
wondered how much of what the paper found to be going on is about the
timing of income changes in response to ﬁnancial shocks.
Laurence Ball thought the facts reported in the paper were basically
right, and he agreed with Perry that hedge funds must be a big part of the
story. But he also wondered how precisely hedge funds might be driving
the observed change in cyclicality. Possible explanations included regu-
latory changes, changes in social norms, changes in tax rates, or some
combination of those elements.
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